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ABSTRACT
In order to support air traffic control services, the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has mandated the use of automatic dependent surveillancebroadcast (ADS-B) in aircraft in certain classes of airspace by January 2020. This system
aims to replace the legacy approaches, such as primary and secondary radars, by employing
global navigation satellite systems for its operation to generate a precise air picture for air
traffic management. The major downside of this system is its security as it broadcasts
information of an aircraft such as its position and velocity over an unencrypted datalink.
This lack of security makes the ADS-B vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks which can
compromise the safety and security of airspace systems. Therefore, it is important to detect
these attacks. This dissertation aims at developing methods able to efficiently detect cyber
attacks that target ADS-B systems. The proposed methods are based on supervised machine
learning models. Therefore, these methods require to be trained using reliable training
datasets. In this dissertation, real data as well as simulated one are used to build training
datasets and validate the efficiency of the machine learning methods. From this data,
several features are extracted depending on the attack type. Results confirm that these
methods are reliable, accurate, and independent with high detection and low false alarm
probabilities. In addition, unlike existing solutions, these techniques do not rely on
information from other surveillance methods and are compatible with current ADS-B
systems.

xiv

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [1], in FY2018,
there were an average of 5400 aircraft flying in the U.S airspace at any given minute during
peak operational times. Figure 1.1 shows how the US airspace is dense and crowded at a
given time [2]. It is anticipated that world-wide flights will double between 2015 and 2034
[3]. In addition to the estimated 5% yearly increase in manned flight traffic globally during
the next 15 years, the unmanned aerial vehicles/systems (UAV/USA) flights will also
greatly increase. It is anticipated that about 250,000 UAV/UAS will operate in the U.S by
2035 which is much larger than the total of 45,000 passenger aircraft in the world [4]. To
accommodate this vast number of aircraft and flights, airspace safety and capacity must be
improved.
This improvement requires highly accurate navigation and surveillance procedures.
Existing aircraft surveillance methods fall into three rudimentary categories [5]:
1) Procedural Air Traffic Control (ATC): In this approach, pilots are required to report
their positions regularly using radio communications. This approach is mostly employed
in areas such as oceans where little or no radar coverage is available.

1

Figure 1.1. An illustration of number of aircraft flying over the U.S. at any instant of time [2]

2) Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR): PSR is a non-cooperative standalone surveillance
system that determines an aircraft position through its distance and azimuth with respect to
the station. This system is independent and does not rely on information from the target
aircraft.
3) Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR): SSR is a cooperative and partially independent
surveillance system that determines an aircraft position via a combination of radar target
return and aircraft transponder reply when interrogated by a ground station.
Many of the existing ATC technologies have been used for more than 50 years. In
addition, systems such as the ground-based SSR and PSR are very costly to operate and
maintain. Most importantly, these technologies are slow in their operation and are not able
to accommodate the upcoming increase in air traffic. In order to support air traffic control
services, the FAA has mandated the use of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast
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(ADS-B) systems by January 2020 [6]. This system aims to replace the legacy approaches
such as primary and secondary radars by employing global navigation satellite systems for
its operation to generate a precise air picture. This system broadcasts immediate aircraft
position, velocity, direction as well as the aircraft identification number, source, and
destination to nearby aircraft and ground stations on a regular basis. Consequently, its
surveillance rate and accuracy are higher than those of PSR and SSR systems [7].
The major drawback of the ADS-B is its security as it broadcasts information of the
aircraft in plaintext format over unencrypted datalink that makes it easy for cyber attackers
to launch a set of attacks such as eavesdropping, message injection, message modification,
message deletion, and jamming. The impacts of such attacks can range from a simple
distraction of pilots and ground controllers to severe denial of service, which can
significantly increase the risk of aircraft collision and destruct the safety of the national
airspace. Therefore, there is a great need for techniques to detect these attacks.
Several techniques have been suggested to detect ADS-B attacks, which can be
classified into seven categories: fingerprinting, distance bounding, Kalman filtering,
multilateration, group verification, data fusion, and traffic modeling. [8-9]. These
techniques basically intend to identify and verify the plausibility of the locations claimed
by the ADS-B network nodes. However, these methods have several limitations such as
non-real-time performance, slow detection rate, low accuracy, and dependency on other
systems and sensors, which make them inefficient for ADS-B attacks detection. In addition,
most of these methods do not take into consideration the constraints of the ADS-B protocol
and the high density of traffic on the ADS-B datalinks.
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1.2 Dissertation Goal and Objectives
Considering ADS-B issues and limitations of the existing approaches, the goal of this
dissertation is to develop reliable and independent techniques to detect cyber attacks that
target ADS-B systems. To achieve this goal, the following objectives are set and met:
•

Investigate ADS-B vulnerabilities and security issues

•

Develop techniques to detect and identify message injection attacks

•

Develop techniques to detect and identify GPS spoofing attacks

•

Develop techniques to detect and identify jamming attacks

•

Extensively test the proposed methods

1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are described in the following.
1) Comprehensive analysis of ADS-B attacks and proposed solutions
Among the works done on the ADS-B in the literature, less effort has been
put on the analysis of ADS-B vulnerabilities and risks they introduce to the air
traffic control. Therefore, in this dissertation, these vulnerabilities are
comprehensively investigated and a risk analysis of attacks is provided. In addition,
two different taxonomies of the ADS-B attacks based on the ADS-B protocol stack
layers and based on the ADS-B security requirements are provided and analyzed.
This type of analysis helps develop more effective security solutions to these
attacks. In addition, several ADS-B attacks detection methods are overviewed and
their in-depth analyses and comparisons are given.
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2) Analysis of supervised machine learning algorithms
In this dissertation, supervised machine learning algorithms are employed
to detect possible anomalies, which can be due to cyber attacks, in the received
ADS-B messages. Different machine learning algorithms such as neural networks,
decision tree, random forest, and support vector machine are analyzed and
compared. Each algorithm depends on a number of hyperparameters whose
selections control the underfitting and overfitting of the algorithm over the training
data. Therefore, the impact of these parameters on the efficiency and detection
performance of algorithms are also investigated.
3) Development of training datasets
The supervised machine learning algorithms need to be trained on solid
reliable training datasets. Unfortunately, there are no training datasets available in
the literature for this purpose. Therefore, to create training datasets, the ADS-B
transmission is simulated to receive and collect simulated ADS-B data. In addition,
the real-time ADS-B message library from OpenSky Network is used to collect real
ADS-B messages. These messages are analyzed and several features such as signal
energy, Doppler shift, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), mean Eigenvalues, etc. are
extracted from them. These features are used to construct the training datasets.

5

The aforementioned contributions were published and presented in the following
journals and conferences:
•

M. Riahi Manesh and N. Kaabouch, “Cyber Attacks on Unmanned Aerial System
Networks: Detection, Countermeasure, and Future Research Directions,”
Computers & Security, vol 85, pp. 386-401, 2019.

•

M. Riahi Manesh, M. Saeedi, E. Ghribi, and N. Kaabouch, “Performance
Comparison of Machine Learning Algorithms in Detecting Jamming Attacks on
ADS-B Devices,” IEEE Conference On Electro Information Technology (EIT), pp.
1-7, 2019.

•

M. Riahi Manesh, Jonathan Kenney, Wen Chen Hu, Vijaya Kumar Devabhaktuni,
and Naima Kaabouch. "Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks on Unmanned Aerial
Systems." IEEE Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC),
pp. 1-6, 2019.

•

M. Riahi Manesh, M. Mullins, K. Foerster, and N. Kaabouch, “A Preliminary Effort
toward Investigating the Impacts of ADS-B Message Injection Attack”, IEEE
Aerospace Conference, 2018.

•

M. Riahi Manesh and N. Kaabouch. "Analysis of vulnerabilities, attacks,
countermeasures and overall risk of the Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS-B) system." International Journal of Critical Infrastructure
Protection, 2017.
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Other related publications are:
•

M. Riahi Manesh and N. Kaabouch. "Security Threats and Countermeasures of
MAC Layer in Cognitive Radio Networks," Ad Hoc Networks, 2018.

•

M. Riahi Manesh, Y. Arjoune, and N. Kaabouch. "A bit error rate estimation
method

for

wireless

communication

systems."

IEEE

Computing

and

Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC), pp. 835-840, 2018.
•

M. Riahi Manesh, S. Subramanian, N. Kaabouch, “Spectrum Occupancy
Monitoring Using a Probabilistic Model”, Computer Networks, Vol. 124, pp. 87–
96, 2017.

•

M. Riahi Manesh, A. Quadri, N. Kaabouch. “An optimized SNR estimation
technique using particle swarm optimization algorithm,” IEEE Computing and
Communication Workshop and Conference, pp. 1–7, 2017.

•

A. Quadri, M. Riahi Manesh, N. Kaabouch. “Noise cancellation in cognitive radio
systems: A performance comparison of evolutionary algorithms,” IEEE Computing
and Communication Workshop and Conference, pp. 1–7, 2017.

•

M. Riahi Manesh, N. Kaabouch, H. Reyes, and W.C. Hu. “A Bayesian approach to
estimate and model SINR in wireless networks,” International Journal of
Communication Systems, 2016.

•

M. Riahi Manesh, N. Kaabouch, H. Reyes, and W.C. Hu. “A Bayesian model of
the aggregate interference power in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Ubiquitous
Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference, pp. 1–7, 2016.

•

M. Riahi Manesh, Md. A. Shakib, N. Kaabouch, and W.C. Hu. “Performance
Evaluation of Spectrum Sensing Techniques for Cognitive Radio Systems,” IEEE
7

Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference, pp. 1–
7, 2016.
•

A. Quadri, M. Riahi Manesh, N. Kaabouch. “Denoising Signals in Cognitive Radio
Systems Using An Evolutionary Algorithm Based Adaptive Filter,” IEEE
Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference, pp. 1–
7, 2016.

1.4 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the ADS-B systems including ADS-B message
format, datalinks, and protocol stack. In addition, this chapter describes the ADS-B attacks
and vulnerabilities and provides a risk analysis of these attacks. A review of the existing
literature about proposed solutions to detect the ADS-B attacks as well as their analyses
and comparisons are also provided in this chapter.
Chapter 3 gives the attack detection methods used in this dissertation work.
Specifically, this chapter describes the attack models that are developed to simulate three
attacks, namely message injection, GPS spoofing, jamming. In addition, the processes of
creating training datasets for each attack to be used in machine learning algorithms are
explained in this chapter. Finally, the chapter gives descriptions of the machine learning
algorithms used in this dissertation.
Chapter 4 describes and analyses some examples of results after applying the
detection algorithms on the three aforementioned attacks, message injection, GPS
spoofing, and jamming. An in-depth analysis and a comparison of different algorithms are
8

also given in this chapter. In addition, this chapter discusses the impacts of algorithms’
hyperparameters on each algorithm’s detection performance.
Chapter 5 finally concludes this dissertation and provides future works and open
research directions.
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Chapter 2
OVERVIEW OF ADS-B
In this chapter, overviews of the ADS-B systems and attacks targeting these
systems are provided. In addition, a risk analysis of these attacks as well as their
classifications, one based on the ADS-B protocol stack layers and one based on the ADSB security requirements, are given. Moreover, an overview of several detection techniques
is provided, and in-depth analyses and comparisons of these methods are provided.
2.1 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
The FAA published a final rule titled “Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS–B) Out Performance Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control (ATC)
Service” in 2010. According to this rule, all aircraft in specific classes of national U.S.
airspace are required to be equipped with ADS-B systems by January 2020 [6]. ADS-B is
the principal element of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) project
which aims to shift the air traffic control infrastructure to navigation satellite-based systems
such as Global Positioning System (GPS) rather than a radar-based one to obtains location
information. This transformation results in an increase in safety and capacity of air traffic
systems as well as a decrease in deployment and maintenance costs. The terminology of
ADS-B can be explained as follow:

10

Automatic: ADS-B is considered as an automatic system since it does not comprise a pilot
or controller.
Dependent: ADS-B operation is considered dependent since the information broadcasted
by this system is dependent on the data received by the GPS receiver of the aircraft.
Broadcast: ADS-B follows a broadcast protocol meaning that instantaneous aircraft
information such as position, velocity, heading, aircraft identification number, source, and
destination are broadcasted to nearby aircraft and ground stations as shown in Figure 2.1.
This broadcasting is done every second over unencrypted datalinks, which is faster than
that of primary and/or secondary surveillance radars that update position data once every
4 to 5 seconds [7]. As a result, ADS-B can provide a faster surveillance rate as well as a
higher accuracy than those of primary and secondary surveillance radars.

Figure 2.1. Operation of ADS-B
11

ADS-B can improve the airspace safety through increasing the situational
awareness of pilots and controllers, avoiding flight collisions and runway incursions more
efficiently, and performing air traffic control management more precisely in remote
geographical locations where no radar coverage exists. In addition, airspace capacity can
be increased as the position monitoring gets more accurate. Therefore, the ATC system can
accommodate a larger number of aircraft using reduced aircraft separation as well as
optimized departures and approach procedures. Furthermore, because the ADS-B
infrastructure is based on straightforward ultra-high frequency (UHF) ground stations that
are significantly less expensive and less complex than the legacy surveillance radar
stations, the deployment and maintenance costs are also cheaper [5]. The implementation
plan proposed by FAA’s NextGen includes hundreds of ADS-B ground stations placed
approximately 150 to 200 miles apart [6].
2.1.1 ADS-B Datalinks
There are two datalink standards used to transmit ADS-B data to these stations:
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) and Extended Squitter (1090ES). The UAT has
specifically been designed for ADS-B use and contains a message data block of 272-bit
which is much larger than the 112 bits of 1090ES; so that it can handle complementary
aviation services information. UAT’s functional frequency is 978 MHz which supports a
data rate of 1 Mbps. However, the UAT protocol and message format are not compatible
with the existing ATC systems.
In order to reduce the cost impact on civilian as well as military aviation fleets, the
FAA has employed the Extended Squitter standard. The basis of this standard is the current
interrogation equipment mechanism which is present in the Mode S transponders. The
12

Mode S message format includes 56 bits which have been extended by 1090ES standard
to 112 bits, hence the name of Extended Squitter. Figure 2.2 illustrates the ADS-B
hierarchy and relationship of the transponder protocols with the ADS-B standards. As it
can be seen, the 1090ES protocol is developed on the current Mode S protocol. Figure 2.2
also shows that the 1090ES is entirely different from the UAT datalink standard. The
1090ES protocol enhances the message fields for the ADS-B surveillance data and
consequently, the ADS-B function can be employed in existing Mode S transponders.
Consequently, an aircraft fleet can make use of 1090ES with no additional avionics which
is noticeably more cost-efficient than providing completely new UAT-compatible avionics.

Figure 2.2. ADS-B hierarchy [10]

2.1.2 ADS-B Functions
The functional operation of ADS-B is classified into two categories; ADS-B OUT
and ADS-B IN. ADS-B OUT is the function that regularly broadcasts information of the
aircraft carrying the system such as latitude, longitude, altitude, altitude, and identity. It is
mandatory for the aircraft to be equipped with this service. On the other hand, ADS-B IN
is an optional service by which an aircraft that is appropriately equipped can receive and
show thorough information of other operating aircraft in the covered area.
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In order to provide interoperability between aircraft operating on different ADS-B
standards, the ADS-B system also includes a support component called Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R). This component is able to receive the
traffic information on the 1090MHz or the 978 MHz datalink and rebroadcast it on the
opposite datalink frequency [7], [11]. As the UAT datalink is mainly employed by the
general aviation aircraft, the discussion on ADS-B security is limited to the 1090ES
standard in this dissertation.
2.1.3 ADS-B Message Format
As mentioned above, the 1090ES protocol employs a modified version of Mode S
message format which is extended to 112 bits. Figure 2.3 shows the standardized ADS-B
1090ES message format. As it can be seen, there are five fields in the ADS-B message:
downlink format (DF), capability (CA), aircraft address (AA), data, and parity (PI). The
downlink format field determines the message type. A downlink format of 17 represents
that the type of message is extended squitter indicating that 56 bits in the Data field can be
utilized. The capability field specifies the capabilities of the Mode S transponder, whereas
the aircraft address field is used for aircraft identification purposes and contains the 24-bit
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aircraft address which is unique to each
aircraft. The Data field can carry different types of aircraft information such as surface
position, airborne position, velocity, aircraft status, etc. The first 5 bits out of 56 bit of Data
field is called type code which determines the type of data included in the Data field. Table
2.1 represents a relationship of type code with the content of the data block. The parity
field provides 24-bit long cyclic redundancy check (CRC) information used to detect a
corrupted message. Currently, the ADS-B network is suffering from approximately 33%
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message drop rate, which can be from the congestion on the ADS-B communication
datalinks [8].

Figure 2.3. ADS-B message format
Table 2.1 ADS-B Type Code and Content

Type Code Value
(The first 5 bits of Data field)

Data field content

1-4

Aircraft identification

5–8

Surface position

9 – 18

Airborne position (w/ Baro Altitude)

19

Airborne velocities

20 – 22

Airborne position (w/ GNSS Height)

23 – 27

Reserved

28

Aircraft status

29

Target state and status information

31

Aircraft operation status

2.1.4 ADS-B Protocol Stack
ADS-B air-to-air and air-to-ground protocol stacks are shown in Figures 2.4 and
2.5, respectively. The airborne segment is composed of three layers: airborne applications,
ADS-B IN/OUT, and airborne radio. As such, the ground segment is also composed of
three layers: the FAA applications, ADS-B server, and ground radio. The airborne/ground
radio layer includes three sub-layers, ADS-B message assembly, frame assembly, and RF
modulation/demodulation [12]. The information taken from the airborne application layer
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is prepared for transmission to the other application layers. This task is performed in the
radio application layer, which first constructs the ADS-B messages and then, constructs
the frame that contains ADS-B messages. The constructed frames are modulated and
broadcasted through the air. Finally, at the receiver end, the received data are demodulated,
ADS-B messages are extracted, and delivered to the application layer.

Figure 2.4. ADS-B air-to-air protocol stack [12]

Figure 2.5. ADS-B air-to-ground protocol stack [12]

2.2 ADS-B Vulnerabilities
According to the FAA report [6], employing ADS-B does not cause an aircraft to
undergo any increased risk. However, according to some recent papers [13-14], it is easy
to exploit the unencrypted broadcast nature of the ADS-B and compromise the ADS-B
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security. In addition, according to a recent report by the European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security (ENISA), the aviation division has globally been
experiencing a growth in information security encounters [15]. As an example, there are
about 12 major cyber attacks that target Airbus Group each year [16].
As previously mentioned, the origin of ADS-B vulnerabilities comes from the
nature of its wireless broadcast protocol which requires that ADS-B messages are
broadcasted as unencrypted plaintexts on unauthenticated datalinks. Therefore, because of
the lack of security procedures in the ADS-B communications, it is easy for adversaries to
launch cyber attacks by means of available and off-the-shelf hardware and/or software.
Using such tools, an adversary is able to capture and modify the ADS-B messages, delete
them, inject deceptive ones, and/or jam the whole datalink for an aircraft or within a limited
geographical area. In other words, as shown in Figure 2.6, the ADS-B vulnerabilities can
be divided into five types: eavesdropping (message interception), message deletion,
message injection, message modification, and jamming (flooding) which will be
overviewed in the following sections.

Figure 2.6. Attacks targeting ADS-B systems
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These vulnerabilities have been classified in two different taxonomies, one based
on the ADS-B protocol stack and one based on ADS-B security requirements. The
classification of vulnerabilities based on the ADS-B protocol layers is illustrated in Figure
2.7. As it can be seen, the message modification attack is classified under the message
assembly layer since this attack aims to disrupt the operation of the message assembly
function of the ADS-B protocol which is responsible for the bit-by-bit construction of the
ADS-B message. Message deletion and injection attacks are also considered threats to the
frame assembly layer of ADS-B layer protocol stack as these attacks insert messages to or
delete them from the ADS-B frames under transmission. Eavesdropping and jamming
attacks are classified under the RF modulation layer because they are essentially launched
on the physical layer.
The classification of the ADS-B attacks according to the security requirements
namely authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and availability, is shown in Figure 2.8.
In the following, a description of each of the security requirements in the context of ADSB is given. However, not all requirements are fulfilled by the ADS-B 1090ES standard.
Authentication: The receiver of a communication should be able to determine the identity
of the transmitting nodes at any time. However, an ADS-B message injection violates the
authentication requirement because a malicious node can broadcast ADS-B messages using
fake identities that cannot be authenticated.
Integrity: ADS-B data Integrity necessitates that ADS-B messages should not be changed
or modified during the transmission. As a result, message deletion and message
modification attacks violate the data integrity requirement and hence, they are categorized
under this class.
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Confidentiality: Data in the network should only be available to authorized entities. Any
activity that leads to the leak of the information to unauthorized or malicious users violates
the confidentiality requirement. Therefore, we classify eavesdropping under this category.
Availability: Availability means that ADS-B messages and services must be always
available to subscribed and authorized entities. An attacker, for example, can jam the ADSB of an aircraft or ground station and perform a denial-of-service attack. Therefore,
jamming and flooding are classified under this category.

Figure 2.7. Classification of ADS-B attacks with respect to its protocol layers

Figure 2.8. Classification of ADS-B attacks with respect to security requirements
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2.2.1 Eavesdropping (Message Interception)
Eavesdropping or message interception attack is the action of listening to ADS-B
broadcast transmissions. This attack can be considered as the simplest among all other
threats which can be caused by the lack of encryption methods in the ADS-B protocol [7].
The presence of eavesdropping has been a concern since the early development stage of
ADS-B as it can be the origin of some other complicated attacks. It should be mentioned
that it is technically impossible to avoid eavesdropping if the messages are not entirely
encrypted. Although a few countries such as the UK have set laws against unintended
recipients that listen to broadcast messages, these laws have been shown to be inefficient.
2.2.2 Jamming
Jamming attacks are typically launched by deliberately sending out packets to
hinder sending or receiving data by legitimate members in a communication, which in turn
can lead to denial of service. The jammer might cause an authentic user to never find an
idle channel by continuously sending packets of data. Jamming attacks are known to be
serious problems in wireless networks. However, the critical nature of traffic data in
aviation and wide and open operation space of aviation intensify the importance of
jamming in such networks.
There are two methods to launch jamming attacks on ADS-B, namely Ground
Station Flood Denial and Aircraft Flood Denial. The purpose of either of these attacks is
to disturb the surveillance network by obstructing the communication datalink. Launching
the Ground Station Flood Denial attack is easier than the other one as the attacker can get
to the proximity of the target and thus, it requires less power. On the other hand, if a ground-
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based attacker intends to jam a flying aircraft device, very high-power jamming signals are
necessary, which makes it difficult to accomplish. This attack can deteriorate the quality
of the datalink and prevent the ADS-B systems from sending and receiving messages.
Thus, the surveillance procedure can be disrupted.
2.2.3 Message Injection
As previously mentioned, there are no authentication procedures in ADS-B
networks. Therefore, any malicious entity can join the network and transmit (inject)
pseudo-legitimate messages into the air traffic communication. Injecting messages can be
simply done by means of non-complex and available technologies [13-14]. Similar to the
jamming attacks, message injection can be launched against both ground stations and
aircraft through Ground Station Target Ghost Injection and Aircraft Target Ghost Injection,
respectively [7]. For instance, to perform a Ground Station Target Ghost attack, an attacker
must create and transmit fake ADS-B messages that have similar properties as actual ADSB messages. Consequently, it can cause fake aircraft targets to appear on the network of
legitimate nodes.
2.2.4 Message Deletion
In this type of attack, the attacker deletes legitimate ADS-B messages from the
network. An example of this attack is the Aircraft Disappearance attack in which the
operating aircraft disappears from the pilots’ and air controllers’ monitors. This attack can
be launched via two methods; constructive interference and destructive interference.
Via constructive interference, the attacker can deteriorate ADS-B messages and
cause bit errors in them so that the receiver considers them as corrupted and drops them.
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As mentioned earlier, the ADS-B message format includes parity bits which are used to
detect corrupted messages.
On the other hand, with the destructive interference, an attacker can destruct the
ADS-B signals within the transmission. To launch this attack, an attacker must create and
transmit a timely-synchronized inverse of the ADS-B signals. Thus, it can fully or partially
destroy the ADS-B message. The key factor in destructive interference is time
synchronization which makes this type of message deletion more challenging and less
probable to launch.
In either case, the consequence is that the legitimate aircraft become invisible to
other aircraft and ground stations, which can lead to air traffic disturbance and increased
risk of aircraft collisions.
2.2.5 Message Modification
Modifying messages of legitimate nodes in the ADS-B network is the most difficult
attack among all [8]. For a complete message modification attack, an adversary should
have on-site access to legitimate network equipment such as aircraft ADS-B transmitter to
modify the data. There are four other possible methods by which an attacker can perform
this attack; 1) overshadowing, 2) bit flipping, 3) combined message deletion and injection,
and 4) GPS spoofing.
1) Overshadowing: Using this method, signals with higher powers are broadcasted
by the attacker to specific nodes in order to replace or modify the legitimate messages
partly or entirely. It should be noted that this method is different from the jamming attack

22

in which the attacker targets the whole communication datalink by sensing spurious highpower signals.
2) Bit flipping: In the bit flipping approach, the attacker superimposes a fake signal
in order to flip any number of 0’s to 1’s and 1’s to 0’s. The difference of this approach with
overshadowing is that in overshadowing, an ADS-B receiver is forced to decode the fake
ADS-B signal due to its higher received power, but in the bit flipping, legitimate message
bits are modified before being decoded by the receiver.
3) Combined message deletion and injection: Launching a message deletion and
subsequently a message injection attack can also result in the appearance of newly modified
messages in the network.
4) GPS spoofing: The worldwide coverage and reliability of the GPS have made
this system the first standard choice for systems, devices, and applications that require
navigation, tracking, and/or time synchronization [17]. Among those, the ADS-B system
is also entirely dependent on GPS data in order to obtain the three-dimensional location of
aircraft. The GPS receiver of the aircraft receives the data from four or more GPS satellites
and calculates its three-dimensional position. The transmission of the GPS data from a
satellite to the GPS receiver is done over unauthenticated and unencrypted channels which
makes this transmission insecure. As a result, the GPS receiver is vulnerable to an attack
known as GPS spoofing [18-23], in which fake signals similar to GPS satellite signals are
transmitted at a higher power by an attacker. By altering the GPS data in these signals, the
attacker can make the GPS receiver of the aircraft estimate a wrong position. As a result,
although indirectly, an attacker can modify the outgoing ADS-B messages by means of a
GPS spoofing attack.
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A message modification attack by means of overshadowing, bit flipping, or GPS
spoofing method is more detrimental as legitimate messages are modified during or prior
to the transmission which makes recipients of the messages consider them as legitimate
[24-25].
By modifying the ADS-B messages, deleting legitimate ones, injecting misleading
ones, or jamming the channel, ADS-B attackers can impact the reliability of
communications between aircraft and air traffic control. This can affect the flight operation
management as a result of providing unreliable data to other information systems.
Consequently, compromised systems can have cascading effects on overall ATC operation.
Examples of systems and procedures that can be affected are [15]:
•

Communication, navigation, and surveillance systems

•

Air traffic management navigational aids and approaches

•

Flight tracking systems

•

Flight display systems and management

•

Departure control systems

•

System monitoring & control center

•

Passenger-airline communication systems

2.3 Risk Analysis of the ADS-B Attacks
Depending on attack type, the impacts of each attack as well as the likelihood of
launching it differ. A risk analysis of these attacks considering the likelihood and impact
of each is given in Table 2.2. This table shows four categories of risk: high, medium to
high, medium, and low risks which are represented by red, orange, yellow, and green
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colors, respectively. Any of these four categories are selected according to a high, medium,
or low attack impact as well as a high, medium, or low attack likelihood.
As it can be seen, since ADS-B employs no encryption procedures in broadcasting
messages, the likelihood of eavesdropping on communications is high. Nevertheless, this
vulnerability does not directly damage ATC systems and thus, is classified as with the least
impact and the lowest risk.
A medium risk can be associated to the message deletion attacks since these attacks
are difficult to launch and require time synchronization which makes the likelihood of
performing these attacks low. The impact of these attacks on air traffic control and
management system can be categorized as medium due to the fact that ATC systems are
still supported by backup technologies such as the multilateration even if an aircraft ADSB messages are deleted by such attacks.
Message modification attacks have a high impact on the air traffic control as the
attacker can remotely hijack the aircraft and cause aircraft collisions. However, the
likelihood of this attack is minimum which is because of the high complexity of this attack
due to strict time synchronization and precision this attack requires. As a result, this type
of attack introduces a medium to high risk to air traffic control. The same class of risk is
anticipated from a jamming attack as it is more likely to happen because an attacker can
simply get to the vicinity of a ground station and jam the ADS-B communication in the
area under coverage, which can lead to denial of surveillance systems. But, the impact of
this attack depends on the jamming signal power and the area it covers. Therefore, a
medium impact can be considered for this attack.
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Message injection attacks can significantly disturb the air traffic, disrupt the
collision avoidance system, and increase the risk of collisions and thus, are given a high
impact and high likelihood—according to their level of difficulty. Therefore, they can be
classified in high risk category.
Table 2.2. Risk analysis of ADS-B vulnerabilities
Impact of attack
Low
Low

Medium

Message deletion Message modification

Attack’s
Medium
likelihood
High

High

Jamming
Eavesdropping

Message injection

As discussed previously, the ADS-B vulnerabilities primarily rise from the
unencrypted and unauthenticated wireless transmission between aircraft and ground
stations. Attackers within the range of ADS-B transmission can impact the security of air
traffic.
In order to analyze attacks’ risks further, it is also important to know the type of
potential ADS-B attackers. According to [15], there are three types of attackers:
1) Insider attackers: These are airport, ground station, or aircraft crew members
with malicious intent. Many staff members have the authority to physically access to
restricted areas, restricted IT systems, and interconnected devices and networks. As a
result, the risk of performing attacks such as message modification, deletion, and jamming
is increased. In addition, if one particular flying aircraft is the target of such attacks, the
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probability of success of these attacks is higher when they are performed by insider
attackers than remote ones.
2) Malicious airport/aircraft passengers: Attackers of this type have restricted
access to physical areas and equipment. Therefore, the risk of a successful attack imposed
by them is less than that of insiders. However, although less likely, a malicious passenger
onboard an aircraft can still launch various ADS-B attacks against that aircraft during the
flight.
3) Remote attackers: These attackers are not physically present in an airport or
aircraft, they have no access to ADS-B systems, and they typically launch attacks from
unknown locations. Thus, the attack area covered by these attackers is limited. It is unlikely
that these attackers can disturb the communication of specific aircraft during the whole
flight because the attack is no longer effective when the aircraft is out of the attack area.
However, remote attackers can effectively perform denial of service attacks and jeopardize
air traffic control in the area under their coverage. The possibility of presence of remote
attackers in the network is higher than that of the other two types.
2.4 Literature Review
As discussed in the previous sections, the impacts of attacks that target ADS-B
systems can range from a simple distraction of pilots and ground controllers to severe
denial of service, which can tremendously increase the risk of aircraft collision and destruct
the security of the national airspace [10]. These weaknesses are imposing concerns as the
deadline for complete compliance by the aviation industry approaches. Even though the
aviation agencies formerly estimated that, by 2013, 70-80 percent of commercial aircraft
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all over the world would be equipped with ADS-B [26], the Department of Transportation’s
Inspector General has recently reported [27] that compliance in the aviation industry is
taking longer than planned schedule. According to this report, ADS-B security concerns
have caused some doubts for the aviation community to follow the NextGen deployment
plan. As a result, some significant solutions must be developed to detect ADS-B attacks.
Since the last decade, the amount of research about ADS-B security has been
increasing. For instance, authors of [28-29] investigated the idea of “e-enabled aircraft”
which employs the aviation and commercial wireless data links, communication standards,
and ground, air and space infrastructures to modernize ATC and discussed the privacy and
security issues of the ADS-B as a means for “e-enabled aircraft”. In [7], McCallie et al.
analyzed ADS-B vulnerabilities and their level of difficulty and provided some
recommendations to enhance ADS-B security. In [30], the security of the NextGen project
and ADS-B were examined and a structured security approach was proposed. The authors
of [31] investigated the fusion of the ADS-B data with other surveillance data as well as
positioning techniques in securing ADS-B. In addition, they comparatively evaluated
group verification and Kalman filtering methods to find a more reliable localization
approach. In [10], [13], and [14], besides analyzing the security of ADS-B, the authors
evaluated the feasibility and ease of implementing ADS-B attacks using cheap and
available hardware and software. In some recent works, the authors of [8], [9], and [32]
investigated security issues of the ADS-B and analyzed some theoretical and practical
security solutions.
It must be noted that the first and foremost step toward securing ADS-B against
cyber attacks is “detection”. In other words, applying an appropriate countermeasure
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primarily requires accurate detection and identification of the attack. To this end, existing
methods to detect ADS-B attacks can be classified into seven categories, as shown in
Figure 2.9.

Figure 2.9. Classifications of ADS-B attacks detection methods
In general, these techniques aim to cross-check the location claimed by the ADS-B
network members and can be divided into two categories: 1) location verification and 2)
location determination. The methods of first category attempt to determine the credibility
of a claimed location in a received ADS-B message by utilizing estimation algorithms that
determine the probability that a claimed position is true. On the other hand, location
determination techniques directly identify the physical position of the aircraft to doublecheck its trustworthiness. In the following, for each category, the advantages,
disadvantages, and implementation issues are discussed.
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2.4.1 Fingerprinting
The concept of fingerprinting is based on identifying signatures of legitimate nodes
in a network that provide useful information for implementing systems to detect network
intrusions [33]. Fingerprinting schemes encompass various methods for authentication and
identification, which are based on hard-to-replicate features such as software
imperfections, hardware imperfections, and/or characteristics of the transmission channel.
Software-based

fingerprinting

methods

attempt

to

distinguish

distinct

characteristics of software operating on network equipment. Network equipment
manufacturers often take different paths when implementing software on a given device.
These differences can be exploited to tell apart dissimilar network devices.
Hardware-based fingerprinting approaches seek to identify unique differences in
network hardware. Some of these differences can be used for radiometric fingerprinting,
which utilizes the differences in the modulation of radio signals to identify unique device
signatures. Clock skew is another identifiable hardware feature that can be used to tell apart
wireless devices. Since no two clocks are perfectly synchronized, their time difference can
be employed to create signatures and enable identification.
The third category of fingerprinting is channel/location-based fingerprinting. This
fingerprinting method tries to exploit the natural characteristics of the communications
channel. Various approaches based on received signal strength, channel impulse response
(CIR), and the carrier phase have been shown to be viable alternatives to more traditional
authentication and verification methods.
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2.4.2 Distance Bounding
Distance bounding is a location verification method that operates based on the fact
that the maximum speed an electromagnetic wave can travel with is the speed of light c
[34]. The idea behind this method is that prover node P provides proof that it is in the range
of verifier node V by responding to the challenge message sent by V, as illustrated in Figure
2.10. The round-trip time of the challenge and response messages in addition to some
processing time is used at verifier node V to find an upper bound for the distance between
nodes P and V. This extra piece of distance information can be used to verify the
correctness of the claimed location of a node.

Figure 2.10. Principle of distance bounding
Although this technique has been proposed and tested for close-distance indoor
environments, it has been also proposed for ad hoc networks with a maximum distance of
225 m between the verifier and prover [35-36]. The authors of [37] investigated the impact
of distance bounding on moving nodes and showed that for high-speed objects, distance
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bounding is not an appropriate alternative. In their work, a full localization is achieved in
about 600 milliseconds during which a target with a speed of 600 km/h already moves
about 100 m.
In addition to the inappropriateness of the distance bounding technique for long
distances and high-velocity nodes, there are some other issues that make this technique
unsuitable for the ADS-B. First of all, the distance bounding method can be subject to
various attacks such as distance hijacking as well as mafia and terrorist fraud attacks [3839]. Moreover, a considerable change in the ADS-B protocol is needed since the distance
bounding requires a two-way communication protocol.
2.4.3 Kalman Filtering
Kalman filtering or linear quadratic estimation [40] is used to observe a series of
measurements containing noise and generate estimates of the unknown variables. Kalman
filtering is already employed in air traffic control to filter GPS signals and to avoid aircraft
collisions on runways and taxiways. It plays an important role in the multilateration method
by denoising the received signal and amending the missing data. Particularly, it is utilized
to perform plausibility checks on received data from aircraft equipped with ADS-B [41].
The authors of [42] investigated a multivariable Kalman filtering method that takes into
account local and global correlation functions that relates the aircraft’s actual motion to the
intended information in the ADS-B message. The system determines the geometry and
intent conformances that analyze the direction, altitude, velocity, and motion of the aircraft.
Then, the two conformances are evaluated and compared with an acceptable model to a
number of dimensions.
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Although Kalman fileting has several current and potential applications for ATC,
it suffers from two main vulnerabilities. The first weakness is known as frog-boiling attack
in which an attacker jams the signal of an authentic node and injects fake location data with
a slow rate to make the Kalman filter unaware of changes of the signal. In addition, since
Kalman filtering requires more processing time and is involved with higher computational
complexity, it is more vulnerable to denial of service attacks [8].
2.4.4 Multilateration
Multilateration or hyperbolic localization is an independent surveillance technique
that operates based on the time difference of arrival (TDoA) of a signal at four or more
known stations (antennas) that are linked to a processing center [43]. Since the processing
center is aware of the exact position of the antennas, it can form a hyperboloid from the
TDoA of the signal between two antennas. When a third and a fourth antenna are
considered with respect to a reference antenna, another two hyperbolas can be formed. The
intersection of three hyperbolas will result in the three-dimensional position of the target
node, as shown in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.11. Time difference of arrival (TDoA) localization
The TDoA localization is currently being used to position the aircraft on the ground
in different US airports [44]. Since TDoAs can be computed from aircraft communication
in its current form, the main benefit of multilateration is that it does not require any changes
to be made on the aircraft. As an extension of multilateration, wide-area multilateration
(WAMLAT) has been also the interest of the research community to position airborne
vehicles. The work in [45] showed an accuracy of about 30 m at the distance of 90 nautical
miles using wide-area multilateration compared to the accuracy of about 20 m using ADSB technology. However, as shown in Figure 2.12, the accuracy of multilateration degrades
as distance goes over 100 nautical miles.
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Figure 2.12. Comparison of location estimation accuracies when utilizing primary radar,
wide-area multilateration, and ADS-B [45].
To get higher accuracy in hyperbolic multilateration, the separation of the receiving
antennas should be as much as possible. Due to geographical and coverage limitations, this
requirement is not necessarily always satisfied. Thus, the authors of [46] proposed an
elliptic-hyperbolic multilateration in which an ellipse is formed from the total sum of a
Mode S interrogation and its response. The intersection of the ellipse and hyperbolas lead
to a more accurate three-dimensional position.
Multilateration using ADS-B signals has been already discussed in the literature
[47-49]. In [47], the authors compared ToA- and TDoA-based localization of multiple air
targets using the received ADS-B messages. Moreover, they showed that the fusion of both
algorithms would lead to better results. In a recent work [49], the authors proposed a new
air-to-ground communication system based on adaptive modulation and beamforming
assisted by ADS-B and multilateration techniques. Their proposed multilateration
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technique employs the TDoA, angle of arrival, and frequency difference of arrival of the
ADS-B messages to implement a hybrid localization mechanism and provide a precise
estimate of aircraft location.
Although the multilateration is a low-cost and successful positioning method, there
are some implementation issues that challenge its use as a secure location verification. One
of these issues is the problem of multipath propagation of the signal in wireless networks
which means that a signal is received in an antenna from different paths. This phenomenon
makes the calculation of TDoA erroneous. Another issue is the dependency of the TDoA
processing center on a large number of receiving stations to be able to find an accurate
estimate of the target’s position. In the case of failure of any ground station, the accuracy
of the estimated position can be degraded. In addition, a separate link between each
receiving station and the processing center is needed.
2.4.5 Group Verification
Group verification is a method of location verification for ADS-B which is used by
a trusted group of aircraft that perform multilateration in the air [28]. Four or more aircraft
should first authenticate and build trust to create a group and then, by applying
multilateration based on TDoA or received signal strength, they can identify the presence
and positions of non-members in the air.
Although the idea of group verification is useful, there are some implementation
challenges that must be considered. One of the challenges is the need for each aircraft to
be equipped with ADS-B IN to be able to perform multilateration. Since ADS-B IN is an
optional module based on the ADS-B requirements, this requires extra cost. In addition,
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establishing trust between a network of aircraft requires bidirectional communications of
ADS-B systems. Furthermore, threats of reactive jamming attacks should be taken into
consideration. Although difficult, a reactive smart jammer can select a group of aircraft
and jam their communications to hinder the multilateration process.
2.4.6 Data Fusion
Data fusion is a method to fuse and correlate data obtained from different sources
to get more accurate and reliable results compared to the ones obtained from a single
source. The idea of data fusion can be performed by means of different approaches such as
probabilistic modeling and analysis, machine learning and fuzzy logic. Type of data to be
fused, type of application, and required fidelity of results identify the data fusion method
[50].
Taking the ADS-B security into account, data fusion is used to cross-check the
position information obtained from ADS-B with the position information obtained from
other independent sources such as primary or secondary radar, multilateration, and flight
plan [51-52]. Any deviation of the information from the normal operation can be
considered as a threat or an error. This approach enables the development of an automated
error/threat identification and reaction system for air traffic control which investigates the
correlation of the data to uncover inconsistencies in the received data and to finally detect
the attacks.
An advantage of the data fusion scheme for ADS-B is that no modifications to
ADS-B protocol and infrastructure are required. However, in [53], the authors discussed
the problem of different coordinate systems that the fusion of ADS-B and radar data may
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encounter. They proposed the use of a unified Cartesian coordinate system. In addition to
the coordinate system problem, another issue of the fusion of information from different
positioning methods is time adjustment between these techniques. In other words, the
position information taken from the ADS-B system is not synchronized with the data
obtained from multilateration or GPS which mandates time coordination between these
systems.
2.4.7 Traffic Modeling
To verify the location claimed by aircraft in the ADS-B network, one can use
historical air traffic control data along with data mining techniques to model the traffic
pattern of the area and detect any malicious activities. As an example, since received signal
strength has an inverse relationship with distance, it can be used to provide a model to
verify the authenticity of a claimed location. Other examples include considering the angle
of arrival of the signals coming from an aircraft or combination of the received signal
strength and angle of arrival methods and cross-checking with previous historical data of
the same aircraft to verify the claimed position.
The authors in [54] proposed a statistical model to verify the claimed locations in
vehicular area networks. In their approach, they considered the difference of the claimed
locations and estimated locations of the node over a period of time which is assumed to be
a random variable. Based on the central limit theorem, if enough measurements are
obtained, the value of the location difference has a normal distribution with certain mean
and standard deviation. Therefore, it is possible to verify the claimed position if the
distribution parameters are correct.
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2.5 Analysis of Existing Detection Techniques
In this section, the detection methods described above are analyzed and their pros
and cons are examined. Table 2.3 provides a relative comparison of implementation
considerations of these methods. As it can be seen, fingerprinting, distance bounding and
data fusion are the most difficult methods to implement which is due to the extra
requirements that these methods demand. Accordingly, these methods are also costly.
Overall, Kalman filtering and traffic modeling techniques are the cheapest and simplest
ones to deploy.
Table 2.3. Comparison of ADS-B attacks detection methods with respect to implementation
considerations
Type
Multilateration
[45], [47], [48], [55-57]

Difficulty

Cost

Low

Medium

Fingerprinting
[33], [58], [59]

Medium

High

Distance bounding
[34], [35], [37], [60]

High

Medium

Kalman filtering
[40], [42]

Low

Low

Data fusion
[51], [52], [61]

Medium

High

Traffic modelling
[32], [54]

Low

Low

Compatibility
Additional software and processing
units are required.
Requires extra hardware or
software.
Challenge-response protocol is
needed.
Additional sensor measurements and
software is required.
Additional surveillance systems are
needed.
Additional software and processing
units are required.

Tables 2.4 and 2.5 compare the ability of each technique in detecting the ADS-B
attacks and in fulfilling the security requirements, respectively. As it can be seen in Table
2.4, the data fusion and Kalman filtering approaches can detect message injection, message
modification, and message deletion attacks. Most of the other solutions such as distance
bounding, multilateration, and fingerprinting can only detect one vulnerability which
causes these methods to be less efficient.
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Table 2.4. Comparison of ADS-B attacks detection methods with respect to the types of attack
Type
Multilateration
[45], [47], [48], [55-57]
Fingerprinting
[33], [58], [59]
Distance bounding
[34], [35], [37], [60]
Kalman filtering
[40], [42]
Data fusion
[51], [52], [61]
Traffic modelling
[32], [54]

Injection

Modification

Jamming

Deletion

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

In terms of the security requirements, as shown in Table 2.5, all the techniques
except fingerprinting methods are able to provide location integrity by estimating or
determining the location of an ADS-B transmitter. Fingerprinting, as discussed previously,
employs unique features of hardware, software, or transmission channel and can be used
for authentication in the network.
Table 2.5. Comparison of ADS-B attacks detection methods with respect to security requirements
Type
Multilateration
[45], [47], [48],
[55-57]
Fingerprinting
[33], [58], [59]
Distance bounding
[34], [35], [37],
[60]
Kalman filtering
[40], [42]
Data fusion
[51], [52], [61]
Traffic modelling
[32], [54]

Data
integrity

Location
integrity

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Authentication Confidentiality
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Availability

Table 2.6 represents an overall comparison of ADS-B attacks detection methods in
terms of implementation considerations and security provided. The best detection method
is the one that is simple to implement and can provide high security. However, it is still
possible to find a trade-off between these two factors. Considering these factors, methods
such as data fusion and fingerprinting relatively provide high security at the cost of higher
implementation costs. Data fusion methods need to use additional methods of surveillance
that makes these solutions costly, which is against the cost reduction requirements of the
FAA through the NextGen project. Kalman filtering approaches are also able to provide
moderately high security, while simple to implement. However, Kalman filtering methods
are not appropriate candidates for nonlinear systems and take a great deal of time for the
detection as they are dependent on additional third-party sensor measurements. As a result,
these methods are not suitable for time-critical applications of attack detection in ADS-B
networks. Other methods such as distance bounding and traffic modeling should be the last
choice for attack detection as these methods are not efficient due to their low accuracy and
their need for additional changes on ADS-B systems.
Table 2.6. Overall comparison of ADS-B attacks detection methods
Type
Multilateration
[45], [47], [48], [55-57]
Fingerprinting
[33], [58], [59]
Distance bounding
[34], [35], [37], [60]
Kalman filtering
[40], [42]
Data fusion
[51], [52], [61]
Traffic modelling
[32], [54]

Implementation considerations

Security provided

Simple

Low

Moderately difficult

Moderately high

Difficult

Low

Simple

Moderately high

Moderately difficult

High

Moderately simple

Moderately low
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Chapter 3
ATTACK DETECTION METHODS
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, it is obvious that the existing methods
have several shortcomings, including non-real-time performance, high cost, low accuracy,
dependency on other systems and sensors, need for additional software/hardware, and need
for modifications in the ADS-B protocol. In addition, a number of these methods are only
efficient in detecting ground-based attackers and cannot provide a good performance
against airborne attackers.
Taking into account the ever-increasing trend in air traffic, deployment cost, and
time, there is a great need for detection methods that address the aforementioned limitations
and are able to detect as many attacks as possible while maintaining simplicity and
flexibility in their implementations. To contribute in filling this gap, in this chapter,
machine learning-based methods to detect cyber attacks on ADS-B are described.
3.1 Attack Detection Procedure Using Machine Learning
Machine learning can be divided into two broad types of supervised and
unsupervised. The key difference between the two types is that in supervised learning, we
are already aware of the expected output for a given input. In other words, supervised
learning is performed over a ground truth. Hence, the main objective of a supervised
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learning approach is to learn and approximate the relationship between input and output in
a given set of data. Supervised learning, as shown in Figure 3.1, is used for classification
purposes and thus, is the focus of this dissertation. Unsupervised learning, on the other
hand, does not have labeled outputs, so its goal is to infer the natural structure present
within a set of data points. This type of learning is suitable for data clustering.

Figure 3.1. Supervised machine learning

In dense airspace where ground stations and other aircraft receive hundreds of
ADS-B messages, distinguishing legitimate and attacked ADS-B messages is challenging.
The primary concept is to monitor an aircraft's incoming messages, identify
inconsistencies, and detect the attacks. For this purpose, supervised machine learning
algorithms are used. These algorithms must first be trained using reliable training datasets.
In this work, the training dataset is composed of a large number of received ADS-B signals
containing both legitimate and attacked signals from which several features, also called
attributes or characteristics, are extracted. Because ADS-B attacks are different in nature,
these features are attack-specific and are described for each attack later. The data in these
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training datasets are appropriately labeled to indicate legitimate or attacked messages. The
features along with the label of the data enable the machine learning algorithms to learn
the pattern of the data and classify them.
To develop the input features, two types of information can be taken out from the
received ADS-B signals: 1) Information that is obtained after the signals are decoded which
includes the data embedded in the content of the message such as transmitter latitude,
longitude, heading, ground velocity, etc., and 2) information that is extracted from the
ADS-B signals before decoding such as received signal strength, energy, and frequency of
the received signals.
In the following sections, attack models corresponding to three ADS-B attacks
namely, message injection, GPS spoofing, and jamming are explained. In addition, the data
collection process and training dataset development for the aforementioned attacks are
described. Finally, descriptions of different machine learning algorithms used in this work
including logistic regression, artificial neural network, support vector machine, k-nearest
neighbor, decision tree, and random forest are provided.
3.2 Message Injection Attack Detection
In this section, descriptions of how the ADS-B message injection attack is
simulated, how training dataset is built, and how features are extracted are given.
3.2.1 Attack Model and Training Dataset
It is assumed that the attacker is able to inject ghost aircraft either via playback
attack or via purely generating ADS-B messages, which are formatted correctly with
reasonable contents such as latitude, longitude, velocity, heading, etc., and are broadcasted
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in proper time and order according to the ADS-B protocol specifications. In addition, it is
assumed that the attacker employs legitimate ICAO24 aircraft address. It is also considered
that the attacker can be either stationary, ground-based or airborne.
To train and test the neural network, a large number, 𝐾, of ADS-B messages at a
specific instant of time from 𝐾 different aircraft are selected from the OpenSky Network
database [62] and seven features namely receiver latitude, receiver longitude, transmitter
latitude, transmitter longitude, velocity difference, received signal strength, and Doppler
shift are extracted/computed from each ADS-B message. Since these aircraft messages are
not fake, we label all these 𝐾 aircraft as ‘legitimate aircraft’ and denote them by 0’s,
indicating no injection attack is present. Another set of a large number, 𝑀, of ADS-B
messages from 𝑀 aircraft are selected from the same database, OpenSky Network, and the
seven features are calculated for each message. However, the feature values of received
signal strength and Doppler shift are randomly and independently shuffled for these 𝑀
aircraft in order to simulate the injection attack. This shuffling destroys the rational
relationship between the received signal strength and the distance of the transmitter and the
receiver. It also destroys the relationship between velocity and Doppler shift for this set of
𝑀 aircraft. Thus, we label this set of aircraft as ‘fake’ and denote them by 1’s, representing
the presence of injection attacks in the network. These two sets are then combined to create
the training set with 𝑁 = 𝐾 + 𝑀 examples, which is fed to the detection algorithm. Figure
3.2 illustrates a general block diagram of this process. The training and testing are done
using the random sampling method in which the data is randomly divided into the training
and testing set in a given proportion of 70:30, respectively. This process is repeated 10
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times to ensure all the data is involved in the processes of training and testing. Finally, the
output values over these 10 times are averaged.

Figure 3.2. Block diagram of the message injection attack model and training dataset
development

3.2.2 Features for Message Injection Attack Detection
To detect a message injection attack, the features to be selected should be able to
effectively distinguish between legitimate messages and fake injected ones. A list of such
features is shown in Table 3.1. These features include ownship latitude, 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , ownship
longitude, 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , transmitter latitude, 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , transmitter longitude, 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑇 , the difference of
the ownship velocity and the transmitter velocity, Δ𝑣, received signal strength, RSS, and
Doppler shift, Δ𝑓. The first five features are obtained or calculated from the received ADSB messages after decoding. The calculation of received signal strength and Doppler shift
are explained in the following.
Received signal strength (RSS): Assuming that Friis free space channel model [63]
is the dominating propagation model impacting transmission of signals from aircraft to
aircraft or aircraft to ground stations, the RSS can be calculated as follows:
𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑅 =

𝑃𝑇 𝐺𝑇 𝐺𝑅 𝜆2
(4𝜋𝑑)2

(3.1)

where 𝑃𝑅 denotes the received power at the ownship, 𝑃𝑇 represents the transmission power,
𝜆 is the wavelength, 𝐺𝑇 and 𝐺𝑅 denote the transmitter and receiver antenna gains,
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respectively, and 𝑑 is the great circle distance between the transmitter and the ownship,
which is calculated from their coordinates as follows:
𝛼 = sin2 (

𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 −𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅
2

) + cos(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 ) . cos(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 ) . sin2(

𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑇 −𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅
2

𝑑 = 2 . 𝑟 . atan2(√𝛼 , √1 − 𝛼)

)

(3.2)

(3.3)

where 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , and 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 denote the ownship latitude, ownship longitude,
transmitter latitude, and transmitter longitude, respectively, 𝑟 is the mean earth radius, and
atan2(.) is the Four-quadrant inverse tangent function. It is assumed that transmitter and
receiver aircraft are operating in the same class of airspace. Therefore, without loss of
generality, the difference in aircraft’s altitude is ignored. In addition, it is assumed that the
loss from weather effect trivial [32].
Table 3.1. List of features extracted from each ADS-B message

Feature

Description

Ownship latitude, 𝑳𝒂𝒕𝑹

Extracted from ADS-B message data block

Ownship longitude, 𝑳𝒐𝒏𝑹

Extracted from ADS-B message data block

Transmitter latitude, 𝑳𝒂𝒕𝑻

Extracted from ADS-B message data block

Transmitter longitude, 𝑳𝒐𝒏𝑻

Extracted from ADS-B message data block
𝛥𝑣 = 𝑣𝑅 − 𝑣𝑇

Velocity difference

𝑃𝑇 𝐺𝑇 𝐺𝑅 𝜆2
𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑅 =
(4𝜋𝑑)2

Received signal strength, RSS

𝛥𝑓 = 𝑓𝑅 − 𝑓0

Doppler shift
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Doppler shift (Δ𝑓): For moving objects, Doppler shift is the amount of shift in
frequency that a receiver observes relative to the transmitter. In other words, it is the
difference between the received frequency and the transmitted frequency. As it is known,
transmitter frequency in the 1090ES standard is 1090 MHz. This feature is instinctively
related to the velocity difference feature. The relationship of the frequency of the signal at
the receiver and the velocity can be described as follows:
𝑐 + 𝛽.𝑣

𝑓𝑅 = (𝑐 + 𝛽.𝑣𝑅→𝑇 )𝑓0
𝑇→𝑅

(3.4)

where c is the speed of light, 𝑓0 is the transmitted frequency, 𝑓𝑅 is the received frequency,
𝑣𝑅→𝑇 is the ownship ground velocity component toward the transmitter, 𝑣𝑇→𝑅 is the
transmitter ground velocity component toward the ownship, and 𝛽 ∈ {−1, +1} is defined
as follows:
𝛽 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑇 − 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 )

(3.5)

+1
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑥) = { 0
−1

(3.6)

where
𝑥>0
𝑥=0
𝑥<0

Since the heading of every aircraft can be different from the line connecting the two
aircraft coordinates, the following equations can be used to calculate the component of the
aircraft velocities toward each other:
𝑣𝑅→𝑇 = 𝑣𝑅 . cos(𝜃 − 𝐻𝑅 )

(3.7)

𝑣𝑇→𝑅 = 𝑣𝑇 . cos(𝜃 − 𝐻𝑇 )

(3.8)
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where 𝐻𝑅 and 𝐻𝑇 are the ownship and transmitter headings in degrees with respect to the
true north, and 𝑣𝑅 and 𝑣𝑇 are the ownship and transmitter velocities, respectively, which
can be obtained from the content of the received ADS-B message.
The azimuth angle, 𝜃, between the two aircraft coordinates is given by:
𝜃 = atan2(𝜑, 𝜙)

(3.9)

𝜑 = cos(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 ) . sin(𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑇 − 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 )

(3.10)

𝜙 = cos(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 ) . sin(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 ) − sin(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 ) . cos(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 ) . cos(𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑇 − 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 ) (3.11)
3.3 GPS Spoofing Attack Detection
The following subsections describe how a GPS spoofing attack is modeled, how
training dataset is developed, and how features are extracted in this work.
3.3.1 Attack Model and Training Dataset
It is assumed that the attacker spoofs GPS receiver via playback or meaconing
attack. As it is known, meaconing is receiving GPS signals in a remote location and
rebroadcasting them at another location at a higher power. The data collection is done using
real GPS signals received from a software-defined radio. The signals are received using
the RTL-SDR V.3 RTL2832U. The antenna used is an active GPS SMA antenna. The
software used is open source gnss-sdrgui.exe and open-source rtknavi.exe. The RTL-SDR
is set up with a center frequency of 1575.42 MHz and a sampling frequency of 2.048 MHz
for the I/Q signal.
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Figure 3.3. Block diagram of the GPS spoofing attack model and training dataset development

To train and test the machine learning algorithm, a large number of received GPS
data is collected at two locations spaced approximately 480 feet apart. The data collected
at location 1 are considered to be the legitimate GPS data whereas the data collected at
location 2 are taken to be those that attackers intend to replay at a later time. This legitimate
and spoofing data are labeled by 0’s and 1’s, respectively. The labeled data are then
combined to create the training dataset with 𝑁 examples. Figure 3.3 illustrates a general
block diagram of this process.
3.3.2 Features for GPS Spoofing/Meaconing Attack Detection
A set of features that can most effectively distinguish between legitimate and fake
GPS signals must be selected. As it is known, legitimate GPS signals come from GPS
satellites with specific properties such as distance, orbiting speed, transmission power, etc.
A GPS spoofing attacker, on the other hand, has a different speed, distance, transmission
power, etc. These differences can, therefore, be used to develop input features for machine
learning algorithms to detect GPS spoofing attacks. These features include:
• Satellite vehicle number (SVN)
• Signal to noise ratio (SNR)
• Pseudo range (PR)
• Doppler shift (DO)
• Carrier phase shift (CP)
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Satellite vehicle number (SVN): The SVN is a number given to every satellite which
is used to identify satellite orbiting the earth. A decoded received GPS signal simply
provides this piece of information.
Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR): Because the received GPS signal can be mixed with
noise and interference, SNR is used to measure the reliability of GPS data embedded in the
signals. It can be estimated from the received signals using specific algorithms [64].
Pseudo range (PR): The distance between a GPS satellite and a receiver is referred
to as pseudo range. This feature is basically calculated at the GPS receiver by multiplying
the travel time of the signal from a satellite to the receiver with the speed of light, as shown
in (3.12). This travel time is measured by cross-correlating the satellite Gold code with its
receiver-generated replica. The Gold code is unique to every GPS satellite and its
autocorrelation function leads to an equilateral triangle shape, which its peak happens when
the correlation is perfect. This characteristic is used to find the travel time of the signal
from the satellite to the receiver.
𝑃𝑅 = ∆𝑇. 𝑐 = (𝑇 − 𝑇𝑠 ). 𝑐

(3.12)

where 𝑃𝑅 is the pseudo range, ∆𝑇 denotes the travel time of the signal, 𝑐 represents the
speed of light, 𝑇 denotes the reception time at the receiver, and 𝑇𝑠 is the transmission time
at the satellite. This process is shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4. An example of GPS signal phase difference

Doppler shift: At the receiver, the GPS carrier signal, 𝑔(𝑡), is multiplied by a
reference signal, 𝑓(𝑡), as follows:
𝑔(𝑡) × 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑔 sin (2𝜋𝜑𝑔 (𝑡)) × 𝐴0 sin(2𝜋𝜑0 (𝑡)) =
𝐴𝑔 𝐴0
2

[𝑐𝑜𝑠2𝜋 (𝜑0 (𝑡) − 𝜑𝑔 (𝑡)) − 𝑐𝑜𝑠2𝜋 (𝜑0 (𝑡) + 𝜑𝑔 (𝑡))]

(3.13)

where 𝐴𝑔 , 𝐴0 are amplitudes of and 𝜑𝑔 (𝑡), 𝜑0 (𝑡) are phases of the received GPS signal
and the reference signal, respectively. The higher frequency component can be filtered out
leaving the lower frequency component, as follows:
𝑏(𝑡) = 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟{𝑔(𝑡) × 𝑓(𝑡)} =

𝐴𝑔 𝐴𝑓
2

𝑐𝑜𝑠2𝜋 (𝜑0 (𝑡) − 𝜑𝑔 (𝑡))

(3.14)

The phase difference of the GPS signal and the reference signal is defined as:
𝜑𝑑 (𝑡) = 𝜑0 (𝑡) − 𝜑𝑔 (𝑡) − 𝑃

(3.15)

where P is phase ambiguity. Doppler shift, 𝑓𝑑 , which is the frequency difference between
the received GPS signal and the reference signal is calculated by differentiating (20) with
respect to time:
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𝑓𝑑 =

𝑑𝜑𝑑 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡

= 𝑓0 − 𝑓𝑔

(3.16)

Carrier phase shift: Refereeing to (3.15), we can rewrite the carrier phase shift
observed at time T as follows:
𝜑(𝑇) = 𝜑0 (𝑇) − 𝜑𝑔 (𝑇) − 𝑃

(3.17)

We can also write the observation time as a function of phase and frequency as
follows:
𝑇=

𝜑(𝑇)−𝜑0
𝑓0

(3.18)

Therefore, considering that the incoming signal phase received at time T is equal to
the transmitted signal at time 𝑇 𝑆 , the carrier phase observable from satellite S is:
𝜑 𝑆 (𝑇) = 𝑓0 𝑇 + 𝜑0 − 𝑓0 𝑇 𝑆 − 𝜑0𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆

(3.19)

Equation (3.19) can be extended to include multiple receivers and satellites as
follows:
𝜑𝑗𝑖 (𝑇𝑗 ) = 𝑓0 𝑇𝑗 + 𝜑0𝑗 − 𝑓0 𝑇 𝑖 − 𝜑0𝑖 − 𝑃𝑗𝑖

(3.20)

where i and j are used to identify an arbitrary satellite and an arbitrary receiver,
respectively.
3.4 Jamming Attack Detection
In this section, descriptions of how a jamming attack is simulated, how training
dataset is built, and how features are extracted are provided.
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3.4.1 Attack Model and Training Dataset
To build a training dataset for jamming attack detection, the transmission of ADSB signals from a transmitter to a receiver is simulated, as shown in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5. Block diagram of the ADS-B transmission simulation

In the 1090ES standard, ADS-B employs a pulse position modulation (PPM)
method to construct messages. More specifically, an ADS-B message is composed of m =
112 pulses with different time positions to encode the information to be transmitted [6566]. The transmitted signal 𝑠(𝑡) can be represented as follows [67]:
𝑠(𝑡) = 𝐴. [∑112
𝑚=1 rect(

𝑡−2𝑚𝑇+𝑐𝑚 𝑇+𝑇 ⁄2
𝑇

)] sin(2𝜋𝑓𝑐 𝑡)

(3.21)

where A is the amplitude of the signal, rect(.) is the rectangular pulse, 𝑐𝑚 is the bit sequence
to be transmitted, T is the pulse duration and 𝑓𝑐 is the carrier frequency. The received
signal, 𝑥(𝑡), is in the form of

{

𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡)
𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡) + 𝑗(𝑡)

𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑛𝑜 𝑗𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔

where 𝑤(𝑡) and 𝑗(𝑡) are the noise and jamming signal components, respectively.
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(3.22)

The dataset is composed of a large number of received noisy ADS-B signals in the
presence and absence of the jamming signals to account for the attacked and non-attacked
portions of the dataset, respectively. A tone signal with a frequency of 1090 MHz is used
for the jamming signal. To include the impact of different jamming powers in the training
dataset, it is considered that the ratio of the jamming signal power to the transmitted signal
power to be 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, and 1.5.
To build the training database, a large number, 𝐾, additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) signals with an SNR in the range of [-20, +20] dB are generated and added to the
transmitted signal. The transmitted signal is made of 1000 packets (112000 bits). The
corresponding 𝐾 noisy signals are used to calculate the features that are described in the
next section. These measurements are stored and labeled by a 0 indicating no jamming
attack is present.
In a similar process, M noisy ADS-B signals are generated. However, this time,
they are added with jamming signals of different power. The same features are extracted
from these signals. This data is labeled by 1 indicating the presence of jamming attacks.
These two matrices are combined to make the training database containing a total of K +
M samples. Finally, the training and testing are done using the cross-validation method
with 10 folds.
3.4.2 Features for Jamming Attack Detection
To detect jamming attacks, features of the received ADS-B signals that can
differentiate between legitimate and jamming signals must be selected. The most
influential features are shown in Table 3.2 and described as follows:
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Table 3.2. List of features used for jamming attack detection

Features

Description

𝐸𝑏 /𝑁0

Energy per bit to noise power spectral density ratio

Bit Error Rate

1
𝐸𝑏
BER = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−
)
2
2𝑁0

Bad Packet Ratio

BPR = (1 − BER)𝑚⁄𝑏𝑠

Mean Eigenvalue

Calculated from the received samples covariance matrix
+∞

𝐸=∫

Energy test statistic

|𝑥(𝑡)|2 𝑑𝑡

−∞

Energy per bit to noise power spectral density ratio (𝐸𝑏 /𝑁0 ): A jamming signal can
cause an increase in the noise power per unit of bandwidth. Thus, this feature can be used
in detecting jamming attacks. The relationship between this feature and is given by:
𝑆𝑁𝑅 =

𝑆

=
𝑁

𝐸𝑏 𝑅𝑏
𝑁0 𝐵

(3.23)

where S is the signal power, N is the noise power, 𝑅𝑏 is the bit rate, and B is the bandwidth.
Since ADS-B in the 1090ES standard operates on a bandwidth and a bit rate of 1 MHz and
1 Mbps, respectively, SNR is equal to 𝐸𝑏 /𝑁0 [65].
Bit error rate (BER): In binary PPM, the theoretical BER for a non-coherent
receiver, such as an ADS-B receiver, is estimated as [68-69]:
1

𝐸

BER = 2 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 2𝑁𝑏 )
0
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(3.24)

It is anticipated that BER increases when jamming attacks are present. In this work,
the BER is measured by comparing the transmitted bits with the received ones.
Bad packet ratio (BPR): According to the ADS-B protocol, if the cyclic redundancy
check of a received ADS-B message (packet) fails, that message is dropped. As the
jamming attack can increase the number of received erroneous bits, the number of dropped
packets can also increase [70-71]. This feature, which is also known as the bad packet ratio,
can be used to identify if the system is under jamming attacks. The BPR for the PPM can
be theoretically calculated as:
𝐵𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑀 = (1 − BER)𝑚⁄𝑙𝑠

(3.25)

where 𝑚 is the number of bits per packet and 𝑙𝑠 is the number of bits per symbol which is
1 in the case of the ADS-B protocol. In this work, this feature is measured by counting the
ratio of dropped erroneous packets to the total number of transmitted ones.
Energy statistic of the received signal: The suitability of this feature stems from the
fact that in the absence of a jamming signal, the received ADS-B signal energy comprises
the transmitted signal energy and the noise energy. However, under a jamming attack, the
received signal energy is augmented by the jamming signal energy which makes the total
energy of the received signal become much higher than in no-jamming scenario. The
energy statistic, E, of the received signal can then be calculated as follows:
+∞

𝐸 = ∫−∞ |𝑥(𝑡)|2 𝑑𝑡
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(3.26)

Mean Eigenvalues of the received signal covariance matrix: According to [72], the
Eigenvalues of the received jamming signal covariance matrix contains larger values than
that of the non-jamming signal. Therefore, the mean Eigenvalues of the received
covariance matrix is a suitable feature for classifying jammers and licit users.
To calculate this feature, Nt received signal samples, x[n], are obtained and stored
in an array as [64]:
[𝑥[0], 𝑥[1], 𝑥[2], … , 𝑥[𝑁𝑡 − 1]]

(3.27)

A value known as the smoothing factor is chosen and denoted as L. An L × 𝑁𝑡
dimension matrix is formed, where each row of the matrix is comprised of L time-shifted
versions of the received signal samples x[n], as shown by:
𝑥1,1
𝑿=( ⋮
𝑥𝐿,1

⋯
⋱
⋯

𝑥1,𝑁
⋮ )
𝑥𝐿,𝑁

(3.28)

where 𝑥𝑖,𝑗 is the received signal vector sample, L is the number of Eigenvalues and 𝑁𝑡 is
the length of the received signal vector. Like the approach in [73], the sample covariance
matrix is computed as the product of the matrix, X, and its Hermitian transpose, 𝑿𝐻 ,
averaged over 𝑁𝑡 samples, which is given by:
̂ 𝑥 = 1 𝑿𝑿𝐻
𝑹
𝑁
𝑡

The Eigenvalues of the resultant L×L matrix are computed as well as their mean.
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(3.29)

3.5 Supervised Machine Learning Algorithms
As it was previously mentioned, the extracted features of the received ADS-B
signals are used to train the supervised machine learning algorithms in order to enable the
algorithms to detect attacks. In this section, different supervised machine learning
algorithms including logistic regression, artificial neural network, support vector machine,
k-nearest neighbor, decision tree, and random forest are described in detail.
During the training phase, machine learning algorithms typically attempt to
optimize an objective function. A common form of the objective function is the difference
between the algorithm’s output, ℎ𝛉 (𝒙), to a given input 𝒙, and the desired output, y, which
needs to be minimized. For this purpose, an objective function, 𝐶, can be defined as
follows:
𝐶(𝜃0 , 𝜃1 , … , 𝜃𝑝 ) =

1
2𝑁

(𝑖)
∑𝑁
− ℎ𝛉 (𝒙(𝑖) ))2
𝑖=1(𝒚

(3.30)

or in the matrix form,
𝐶(𝛉) =

1
2𝑁

‖𝒚 − ℎ𝛉 (𝒙)‖2

(3.31)

where ℎ𝛉 (𝒙), also known as hypothesis function, denotes the machine learning algorithm
output with parameter 𝛉 = {𝜃0 , 𝜃1 , … , 𝜃𝑝 } for a given input vector x, 𝒚 represents the
desired output for the same given input, N is the total number of training samples and ‖. ‖2
denotes the l2-norm operation. Given the cost function, each machine learning algorithm
can have different outputs and different optimization methods. In the following, each
algorithm is described.
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3.5.1 Logistic Regression
In order to better understand logistic regression, it is helpful to understand linear
regression primarily [74]. In the linear regression algorithm, the output is predicted as a
weighted sum of the inputs. Therefore, it can be used to model the dependence of a target
𝒚 on some features x, which can be represented for a training sample i as follows:
(𝑖)

(𝑖)

(𝑖)

𝑦 = ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑥1 + 𝜃2 𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑝 𝑥𝑝

(3.32)

where p is the number of features of the sample input. The 𝜃𝑗 ’s denote the coefficients or
feature weights which should be properly chosen to minimize the cost function. Various
methods can be used to estimate the optimal weight. The well-known gradient descent
algorithm can be employed to find the weights that minimize the squared differences
between the actual and the estimated outcomes:
(𝑖)
(𝑖)
𝜃̂ = arg min ∑𝑁
− (𝜃0 + ∑𝑝𝑗=1 𝜃𝑗 𝑥𝑗 ))2
𝑖=1(𝑦
𝜃0 ,…𝜃𝑝

(3.33)

which also corresponds to the objective function of (3.30). Using the concept of gradient
descent, 𝜃𝑗 ’s can be using the following equations:
𝜕

𝜃𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗 − 𝛼 𝜕𝜃 𝐶(𝜃0 , 𝜃1 , … , 𝜃𝑝 )

(3.34)

𝑗

Using (3.30) and (3.32) into (3.34) and taking the partial derivatives, one can
obtain:
1

(𝑖)

(𝑖)
(𝑖)
𝜃𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗 − 𝛼 𝑁 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1(ℎ𝛉 (𝒙 ) − 𝒚 ) 𝑥𝑗

where 𝛼 is the learning rate which controls the step of gradient descent algorithm.
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(3.35)

Linear regression performs well for regression, but it is not a suitable candidate for
classification (e.g. classification of presence or absence of attacks) because the predicted
outcome is a linear interpolation between points that provides no meaningful threshold at
which one class can be distinguished from the other.
Logistic Regression is an extension of the linear regression algorithm that can be
used in classification problems with two possible outcomes [75]. It employs a sigmoid
(logistic) function to limit the output of linear regression to a value between 0 and 1 in
order to classify data into two classes. The logistic regression hypothesis function is
defined as:
ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 𝑔(𝛉𝑇 𝒙)

(3.36)

where function 𝑔 is the sigmoid function, as shown in Figure 3.6. This function is in the
form of:
1

𝑔(𝑧) = 1+𝑒 −𝑧

(3.37)

The cost function for logistic regression can be defined as:
𝐶(𝜃0 , 𝜃1 , … , 𝜃𝑝 ) =

1
𝑁

(𝑖)
(𝑖)
∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑓( ℎ𝛉 (𝒙 ), 𝒚 )

(3.38)

where
− log (ℎ𝛉 (𝒙(𝑖) ))

𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 1
𝑓(ℎ𝛉 (𝒙 ), 𝒚 ) = {
− log (1 − ℎ𝛉 (𝒙(𝑖) )) 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 0
(𝑖)

(𝑖)

(3.39)

The objective function can be rewritten in the form of:
1

(𝑖)
(𝑖)
(𝑖)
(𝑖)
𝐶(𝛉) = − 𝑁 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1[𝒚 log (ℎ𝛉 (𝒙 )) + (𝟏 − 𝒚 ) log (1 − ℎ𝛉 (𝒙 ))] (3.40)
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To minimize the logistic regression objective function by means of gradient descent
algorithm, it can be shown that 𝜃𝑗 ′𝑠 need to be simultaneously updated using the following
equation:
(𝑖)

(𝑖)
(𝑖)
𝜃𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗 − 𝛼 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1(ℎ𝛉 (𝒙 ) − 𝒚 ) 𝑥𝑗

(3.41)

Figure 3.6. The sigmoid function

3.5.2 Artificial Neural Networks
An artificial neural network (ANN), such as the one shown in Figure 3.7, is made
of weighted connections between multiple nodes or so-called neurons. Each neuron
contains an activation function and a bias value whereas each link connecting two neurons
(𝑙)

(𝑙)

carries a weight. The activation and bias of neuron j in layer l are denoted by 𝑎𝑗 and 𝑏𝑗 ,
respectively. The first layer in every neural network is the input layer and has the activation
(1)

𝑎𝑗

= 𝑥𝑗 where 𝑥𝑗 is the input feature vector that is obtained from each received ADS-B
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message. The weight from the 𝑘 𝑡ℎ neuron in the (𝑙 − 1)𝑡ℎ layer to the 𝑗 𝑡ℎ neuron in the 𝑙 𝑡ℎ
(𝑙)

(𝑙)

layer is denoted by 𝑤𝑗𝑘 . Therefore, the 𝑎𝑗 can be calculated as follows [76]:
(𝑙)

𝑧𝑗

(𝑙) (𝑙−1)

= ∑𝑘 𝑤𝑗𝑘 𝑎𝑘

(𝑙)

+ 𝑏𝑗

(𝑙)

(𝑙)

𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔(𝑧𝑗 )

(3.41)
(3.43)

where 𝑔(. ) is called the activation function. These functions respond to a stimulus which
is the weighted sum of inputs to a neuron. The widely used activation functions are
sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent, and rectified linear unit (ReLU) which are given as follows:
𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑑 (𝑧) =
𝑔𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ (𝑧) =

1
1+𝑒 −𝑧

2

(3.44)

−1

(3.45)

𝑔𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈 (𝑧) = max(0, 𝑧)

(3.46)

1+𝑒 −2𝑧

The matrix formulation of (3.42) and (3.43) are as follows:
𝒛(𝑙) = 𝒘(𝑙) 𝒂(𝑙−1) + 𝒃(𝑙)

(3.47)

𝒂(𝑙) = 𝑔(𝒛(𝑙) )

(3.48)

Figure 3.7. General flow graph of a neural network with 4 layers

Given the input vector, x, initialized weight, and initialized bias values, the output,
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𝒂(𝐿) , which is the prediction on the presence or absence of the attacker, can be computed
using (3.47) and (3.48). The objective is to minimize the cost function in (3.30), which is
the error between the obtained output and the desired output, y. This objective function can
be rewritten in the context of the neural network as follows:
𝐶(𝑤, 𝑏) =

1

‖𝒚 − 𝒂(𝐿) ‖
2𝑁

2

(3.49)

where N is the total number of training samples, 𝐿 is the number of layers in the network,
𝒚 is the desired output for individual input vector x, and 𝒂(𝐿) is the neural network output
for the same given input.
To minimize the cost function and find the optimal weight and bias values, the
backpropagation algorithm is utilized. This algorithm aims to calculate the cost function
partial derivatives

𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑤

and

𝜕𝐶

with regards to w and b, respectively. Accordingly,

𝜕𝑏

considering an individual training example, we define the error of node j in 𝑙 𝑡ℎ layer as
follows:
(𝑙)

𝛿𝑗
2

1

1

𝜕𝐶𝒙

=

(3.50)

(𝑙)

𝜕𝑧𝑗

(𝐿)

where 𝐶𝒙 = 2 ‖𝒚 − 𝒂(𝐿) ‖ = 2 ∑𝒙(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗 )2is the cost for a single training example x.
we start by calculating the error in the last layer, L, as:
(𝐿)

𝛿𝑗

≝

𝜕𝐶𝒙
(𝐿)
𝜕𝑧𝑗

=

𝜕𝐶𝒙
(𝐿)
𝜕𝑎𝑗

(𝑙)

𝑔′ (𝑧𝑗 )

(3.51)

or in the matrix form by:
𝜹(𝐿) = ∇𝑎 𝐶𝒙 ∘ 𝑔(𝒛(𝐿) ) = (𝒂(𝐿) − 𝒚) ∘ 𝑔′ (𝒛(𝐿) )
where ∇𝑎 𝐶𝒙 = 𝒂(𝐿) − 𝒚 is the vector containing the components of

(3.52)

𝜕𝐶𝒙
(𝐿)

𝜕𝑎𝑗

and ∘ denotes the

Hadamard product. To backpropagate the error in other layers 𝑙 = 𝐿 − 1, 𝐿 − 2, … , 2, we
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can use:
𝑇

𝜹(𝑙) = ((𝒘(𝑙+1) ) 𝜹(𝑙+1) ) ∘ 𝑔′ (𝒛(𝐿) )

(3.53)

where T denotes the transpose operation. By using (3.52) and (3.53), the error 𝜹(𝑙) for all
the layers in the network can be calculated. Once the error is computed, using the following
two equations, the gradient of the cost function with respect to weight and bias values can
be calculated as:
𝜕𝐶𝒙

(𝑙)

(𝑙)

𝜕𝑏𝑗
𝜕𝐶𝒙
(𝑙)
𝜕𝑤𝑗𝑘

= 𝛿𝑗

(𝑙−1) (𝑙)
𝛿𝑗

= 𝑎𝑘

(3.54)

(3.55)

Next, we can update the weight and bias values for 𝑙 = 𝐿 − 1, 𝐿 − 2, … , 2 using the
following equations:
𝜆

𝒘(𝑙) = 𝒘(𝑙) − 𝑁 ∑𝑥 𝜹(𝑙) (𝒂(𝑙−1) )𝑇
𝜆

𝒃(𝑙) = 𝒃(𝑙) − 𝑁 ∑𝑥 𝜹(𝑙)

(3.56)
(3.57)

where 𝜇 is the regularization term. The neural network training algorithm is summarized
in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3. Neural network training procedure

1- Start
2- Input a set of training examples
3- For each training example, feed the network with the input features, x, from ADS-B
message
4- Perform the feedforward operation using
𝒂(𝒍) = 𝒈(𝒛(𝒍) ) and 𝒛(𝒍) = 𝒘(𝒍) 𝒂(𝒍−𝟏) + 𝒃(𝒍)
5- Calculate the error in the last layer, L by
𝜹(𝑳) = (𝒂(𝑳) − 𝒚) ∘ 𝒈′ (𝒛(𝑳) )
6- Backpropagate the error in other layers by
𝑻

𝜹(𝒍) = ((𝒘(𝒍+𝟏) ) 𝜹(𝒍+𝟏) ) ∘ 𝒈′ (𝒛(𝑳) )
7- Compute the gradient of the cost function by
𝝏𝑪𝒙
(𝒍)
𝝏𝒃𝒋

(𝒍)

= 𝜹𝒋 and

𝝏𝑪𝒙
(𝒍)
𝝏𝒘𝒋𝒌

(𝒍−𝟏) (𝒍)
𝜹𝒋

= 𝒂𝒌

8- Go back to 3 until all training samples are fed to the network.
9- Update the weight and bias values using
𝝁
𝒘(𝒍) = 𝒘(𝒍) − ∑ 𝜹(𝒍) (𝒂(𝒍−𝟏) )𝑻
𝑵 𝒙
𝝁
𝒃(𝒍) = 𝒃(𝒍) − ∑ 𝜹(𝒍)
𝑵
𝒙

3.5.3 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
This algorithm can be used for both binary and multiclass classifications as well as
for pure regression problems [77-80]. Considering classification with two possible
outcomes, SVM objective function can be shown to be as follows:
(𝑖)
𝐶(𝛉) = 𝜌 ∑𝑁
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡1 (𝛉𝑇 𝒙(𝑖) ) + (𝟏 − 𝒚(𝑖) ) 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡0 (𝛉𝑇 𝒙(𝑖) )]
𝑖=1[𝒚

where 𝜌 is a regularization parameter and
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(3.58)

0
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡1 (𝑧) = {
−𝑧

𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡0 (𝑧) = {

0
𝑧

𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ≥ 1
𝑖𝑓 𝑧 < 1

(3.59)

𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ≤ −1
𝑖𝑓 𝑧 > −1

(3.60)

Therefore, considering a binary classification with two outcomes, if 𝑦 = 1, we want
𝛉𝑇 𝒙(𝑖) ≥ 1 and if 𝑦 = 0, we want 𝛉𝑇 𝒙(𝑖) ≤ −1. Consequently, the classification of the two
classes of 𝑦 is mathematically based on the sign of 𝛉𝑇 𝒙(𝑖) for training sample i which can
be written as follows:
(𝑖)

(𝑖)

(𝑖)

ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 𝛉𝑇 𝒙(𝑖) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑥1 + 𝜃2 𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑝 𝑥𝑝
′

= 𝜃0 + ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝜇 (𝑖) 𝑦 (𝑖) 〈𝑥 (𝑖 ) , 𝑥 (𝑖) 〉

(3.61)

where 𝜇 (𝑖) are non-zero positive coefficients that are estimated during the learning process,
𝑆 is the set of support vectors, and 〈. , . 〉 denotes the inner product which provides a measure
of similarity between training samples 𝑖 and 𝑖 ′ . The inner product is also called a linear
kernel. We can rewrite (3.61) as
′

ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 𝜃0 + ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝜇 (𝑖) 𝑦 (𝑖) 𝒦𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 (𝑥 (𝑖 ) , 𝑥 (𝑖) )
′

(3.62)

′

where 𝒦𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 (𝑥 (𝑖 ) , 𝑥 (𝑖) ) = 〈𝑥 (𝑖 ) , 𝑥 (𝑖) 〉.
The widely used kernels are linear, quadratic, cubic, radial basis function (RBF),
and sigmoid. The choice of the kernel specifies the separation boundary of different classes.
•

Quadratic and cubic kernels are polynomial kernels with order of 𝛼, which are
defined as follows:
′

′

𝒦(𝑥 (𝑖 ) , 𝑥 (𝑖) ) = (𝑥 (𝑖) . 𝑥 (𝑖 ) + 1)𝛼
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(3.63)

𝛼={
•

2, quadratic kernel
3, cubic kernel

(3.64)

The sigmoid kernel is defined as follows:
′

′

𝒦(𝑥 (𝑖 ) , 𝑥 (𝑖) ) = 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ(𝛽𝑥 (𝑖) . 𝑥 (𝑖 ) + 𝒸)

(3.65)

where 𝛽 is the slope parameter and 𝒸 is the intercept constant.
•

The RBF is defined as follows:
′

′

2

𝒦(𝑥 (𝑖 ) , 𝑥 (𝑖) ) = exp(−𝒢|𝑥 (𝑖) − 𝑥 (𝑖 ) | )

(3.66)

where 𝒢 determines the squared Euclidean distance between the two samples.
3.5.4 k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN)
This algorithm is based on the idea that the points with similar properties stay in
close proximity to each other. It operates by searching for the k training data that are closest
to the new data and determine the class of the new data by identifying the most common
class label [81]. The kNN algorithm can operate using different distance metric as follows:
•

′ 2
Euclidean distance, which is calculated by √∑𝑁
𝑖=1(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 ) where N is the number

of training examples and 𝑥𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥𝑖′ are two training samples.
•

Chebyshev distance which is calculated by 𝑚𝑎𝑥|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖′ |.

•

Mahalanobis distance which is the number of standard deviations away from the
mean.
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3.5.5 Decision Tree
In this algorithm, assuming a training dataset of 𝑘 samples represented
by {(𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ), … , (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘 )} where 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ𝑁 , a decision tree recursively splits the data into
smaller subsets using some specific criteria, such as the Classification and Regression Tree
(CART) method, until all the samples in every subset belong to the same class [82].
Assuming 𝑇 denotes the training data at node 𝑛, for each candidate split 𝑠 =
(𝑗, 𝑡ℎ𝑛 ) consisting of a feature 𝑗 and threshold 𝑡ℎ𝑛 , the algorithm splits the data into two
subsets of 𝑇𝑅 and 𝑇𝐿 as follows:
𝑇𝑅 = {(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 )│𝑥𝑗 ≥ 𝑡ℎ𝑛 }

(3.67)

𝑇𝐿 = {(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 )│𝑥𝑗 < 𝑡ℎ𝑛 }

(3.68)

The CART criterion uses the Gini Index to calculate the impurity of nodes which
is defined as:
𝑔(𝑇) = ∑𝑚 𝑝𝑛𝑚 (1 − 𝑝𝑛𝑚 )

(3.69)

where 𝑝𝑛𝑚 is the proportion of the samples with label 𝑚 to the total number of samples at
node 𝑛. The goodness-of-split, 𝐺, at node 𝑛 is calculated as follows:
𝐺(𝑠, 𝑇) = 𝑔(𝑇) − 𝑃𝐿 . 𝑔(𝑇𝐿 ) − 𝑃𝑅 . 𝑔(𝑇𝑅 )

(3.70)

where 𝑃𝐿 denotes the proportion of the number of samples in 𝑇𝐿 to the number of samples
in 𝑇, 𝑃𝑅 is the proportion of the number of samples in 𝑇𝑅 to the number of samples in 𝑇 at
node 𝑛, and 𝑔(𝑇𝐿 ) and 𝑔(𝑇𝑅 ) are the impurity measures of the split in 𝑇𝐿 and 𝑇𝑅 ,
respectively.
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Once a number of splits by a particular feature at a node is generated, the algorithm
selects the split 𝑠 ∗ that can lead to the maximum reduction in the impurity measure of the
parent node, as follows:
𝑠 ∗ = argmin 𝐺(𝑠, 𝑇)

(3.71)

𝑠

3.5.6 Random Forest
This algorithm is composed of an ensemble of decision tree classifiers in which
each classifier is created by means of a vector sampled randomly and independently from
the input vector, and each tree provides a unit vote for the most popular class to classify an
input vector. The classification of any data is done by taking the majority voted class from
all the tree predictors in the forest [83]. The ensemble of B trees is given as
{𝑇1 (𝑋), 𝑇2 (𝑋), … , 𝑇𝐵 (𝑋)}

(3.72)

where 𝑋 = {𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … } is a vector of the input signal characteristics. The ensemble
generates B outputs as
{𝑦̂1 , 𝑦̂2 , … , 𝑦̂𝐵 }

(3.73)

where 𝑦̂𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖 (𝑋) denotes the prediction of decision tree 𝑖. Outputs of all trees are
aggregated to produce one final classification decision as
𝑌̂ = majority {𝑦̂1 , 𝑦̂2 , … , 𝑦̂𝐵 }

70

(3.74)

Chapter 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This chapter provides examples of results of the analysis of the detection algorithms
discussed in the previous chapter to detect three attacks namely message injection, GPS
spoofing, and jamming that target ADS-B systems and networks. For each attack, different
machine learning algorithms are analyzed and compared extensively.
4.1 Performance Analysis Metrics
To compare the performance of different methods, four metrics including
probability of detection, 𝑃𝑑 , probability of false alarm, 𝑃𝑓𝑎 , probability of miss detection,
𝑃𝑚 , and accuracy are used. These metrics are calculated as follows:
𝑃𝑑 = 𝑃(ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 1|𝑦 = 1)

(4.1)

𝑃𝑚 = 𝑃(ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 0|𝑦 = 1)

(4.2)

𝑃𝑓𝑎 = 𝑃(ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 1|𝑦 = 0)

(4.3)

Accuracy = 𝑃(ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 1|𝑦 = 1) + 𝑃(ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) = 0|𝑦 = 0)

(4.4)

where 𝑃𝑑 is the probability that attacked/fake messages are detected correctly as attacked
ones, 𝑃𝑚 is the probability that attacked/fake messages are incorrectly detected as
legitimate ones, 𝑃𝑓𝑎 is the probability that legitimate messages incorrectly detected as
attacked/fake messages, accuracy is the combined probability that both legitimate and
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attacked/fake messages are detected correctly, ℎ𝛉 (𝒙) is machine learning algorithm output,
and 𝑦 denotes the desired output.
4.2 Message Injection Attack Detection Analysis
In this section, before analyzing the performance of machine learning algorithms
in detecting message injection attacks, the impacts such attacks on air traffic are
investigated.
4.2.1 Impacts of Message Injection Attack
To study the impacts of message injection attacks on air traffic, several aircraft
traffic encounters are developed and potential hazardous events that may occur are
investigated. An aircraft traffic encounter is a situation in which minimum separation
distance between aircraft may be violated. In such a situation, the risk of aircraft collision
is increased and therefore proper actions are necessary to maintain or regain appropriate
separation. For this purpose, several experiments are performed using a Hardware in The
Loop (HWIL) simulation platform.
The HWIL platform includes a real autopilot system mounted on an unmanned
aerial system and a portable ground controller station in order to simulate the ownship.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the block diagram and the actual setup of the implementation,
respectively. The simulation testbed includes three general-purpose computers (GPCs) and
external flight systems which are described below:
GPC 1: This computer is used to simulate intruders and to convert intruder telemetry into
a format consistent with different types of sensors. It also controls the simulation state and
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provided simulated sensor data such as ADS-B and Radar. Only ADS-B data is used in this
work [84-85].
GPC 2: This system is used to record relevant data from all aircraft and, if required, run an
automatic avoidance algorithm in place of pilot action [86-90]. The avoidance algorithm is
run optionally and activated by the ownship pilot on GPC 3.

Figure 4.1. The simulation testbed

Figure 4.2. The actual setup of the simulation
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GPC 3: This station included both the ownship aircraft system software as well as
visualization software. Ownship autopilot may be run in a variety of configurations
including fixed-wing and multicopter. Fixed-wing configuration is normally run using
autopilot hardware in an HWIL configuration. This provides three modes of control
including direct pilot control using an RC console, waypoint control via the autopilot
interface, and automatic control provided by the avoidance algorithm when activated by
the pilot.
External Flight Systems: These systems encompass a Piccolo autopilot and a Piccolo
portable ground station (GCS). The Piccolo autopilot is a comprehensive integrated
avionics system that is mounted on the aircraft and provides inertial sensors, ported air data
sensors, flight control processor, datalink radio, and GPS receiver. The Piccolo portable
ground station is based on the same hardware that drives the airborne component of the
Piccolo avionics system. The ground station’s task is to manage the wireless link to the
Piccolo avionics, receive the data from autopilot, supply differential GPS corrections, and
work as a passage to the operator interface.
To conduct the experiment, as shown in Figure 4.3, a regular lawnmower pattern
for ownship moving in cardinal directions is developed to expose the aircraft to a variety
of geometries in ownship-attacker encounters. Thus, several interactions in each round of
the experiment can be included to monitor the ownship maneuvers in specific situations.
An attacker can inject fake aircraft and interact with ownship randomly to conceal the
intentions of the attacker. In this case, the ownship’s moves and potential air traffic
disturbance that these attacks can cause are monitored.
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Figure 4.3. Regular perpendicular flight plans used in the simulation in addition to three examples
of ghost aircraft injection (message injection) attacks

One of the key metrics to take into account is the well-clear violation which
depends on the separation of the aircraft [91]. This separation can be either distance-based
or time-based. Based on ICAO standards, distance-based separation should typically be at
least 5 nautical miles (30000 feet) horizontally and 1000 feet vertically, as shown in Figure
4.4 [92]. These distances define an aircraft's protected zone, a volume of airspace
surrounding the aircraft that should not be trespassed by any other aircraft. The time-based
separation includes time to the closest point of approach and time to co-altitude. A traffic
advisory (TA) or resolution advisory (RA) is issued when both time to the closest point of
approach and time to co-altitude are smaller than thresholds defined by Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) [93]. The dimensions of the aircraft protected zone
are based on time and are not measured in units of distance. Therefore, the shape of the
area depends on the speed and direction of the aircraft, as illustrated in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.4. Distance-based separation

Figure 4.5. Time-based separation

Depending on the separation of the aircraft, the visualization software run on GPC3
provides different alerts, which are indicated as aircraft color as follows:
•

White indicates well-clear is maintained.

•

Yellow (alert) indicates that ownship must maneuver to avoid violating well-clear
boundaries.
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•

Red (warning) indicates that ownship must immediately maneuver to regain the
well-clear.
To perform the experiment, it is assumed that the ownship is equipped with ADS-

B IN so that the pilot is able to see the traffic information on the screen. It is also assumed
that the only available traffic control method is ADS-B and the pilot has no radio
communication with the air traffic control. The simulated encounters and scenarios are
conducted while the ownship flies over the flight plan shown in Figure 4.6. This plan is
developed in the Piccolo Command Center.

Figure 4.6. The simulated flight plan of the ownship in Piccolo Command Center

Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show two examples of message injection attacks. While the
pilot is flying the ownship over the flight plan of Figure 4.6, the attacker causes fake aircraft
to appear in the vicinity of the ownship on the map. Figure 4.7(a) illustrates that the
ownship is moving toward the east. A ghost aircraft is injected in the west-northwest of the
ownship, as shown in Figure 4.7(b), and the ownship maneuvers are monitored. The yellow
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color of the intruder indicates that the two aircraft are about to violate well-clear and
therefore, ownship must appropriately move to maintain the well-clear. As shown in Figure
4.7(c), to maintain the well-clear and regain a greater separation, the pilot performs a right
turn maneuver.

b) Injection of an intruder close to the
ownship

a) Ownship in normal flight

c) Ownship forced to maneuver to maintain the well-clear
Figure 4.7. An example of message injection attack

Another example of an injection attack is illustrated in Figures 4.8(a) to 4.8(c).
Figure 4.8(a) demonstrates that the ownship is moving toward the north. As shown in
Figure 4.8(b), the injected ADS-B messages cause a fake aircraft to appear very close to
the ownship. The pilot’s traffic display indicates this intruder in red color, meaning that
well-clear is totally violated and immediate actions are required by the pilot to regain well78

clear. The sudden appearance of false aircraft causes the pilot to execute a steep right turn
and start descending to regain well-clear as soon as possible, as shown in Figure 4.8(c).

b) Injection of an intruder very close to the
ownship

a) Ownship in normal flight

c) Ownship forced to maneuver immediately to regain the well-clear
Figure 4.8. An example of message injection attack

It is very likely that, without a proper detection algorithm, neither pilots nor ground
controllers are aware of the ghost nature of the intruder, causing the participants to react
using large, sudden maneuvers to avoid loss of well-clear. Especially in high-density
airspace, these types of maneuvers may significantly increase the risk of collision with
other aircraft. Furthermore, the impacts of this attack can be more dangerous if the attacker
can involve more than one ghost aircraft causing multiple legitimate aircraft to perform
immediate maneuvers to avoid the ghost aircraft.
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4.2.2 Results of Detecting Message Injection Attack
In this section, examples of the results of detecting message injection attacks are
provided. A number of machine learning algorithms are first compared. Then, a detailed
analysis of the most efficient algorithm in detecting message injection, the neural network,
is given. Table 2 illustrates the simulation parameters used in this work.
Table 4.1. Simulation parameters used for message injection attack detection
Parameter

Value/Range

Transmission power, 𝑃𝑇

70 W

Antenna gains, 𝐺𝑅 and 𝐺𝑇

1 dB

Transmission frequency, 𝑓0

1090 MHz

Total number of training examples, 𝑁

6000

Number of legitimate aircraft examples, 𝐾

3000

Number of fake aircraft examples, 𝑀

3000

Number of layers in the model, L

3, 4

Number of hidden layers

1, 2

Number of neurons in each hidden layer

[1, 25]

Activation function

Tanh

Number of iterations

200

Figure 4.9 (a) and (b) show the joint distribution of the RSS and Δ𝑓 for the
legitimate and fake training dataset, respectively. As it can be seen, although the fake
dataset is the shuffled version of the legitimate one, these two joint distributions are almost
identical. This similarity indicates that the distribution of the whole fake data is similar to
that of the legitimate data and thus, superficial detection algorithms cannot simply pinpoint
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this difference to identify the presence of an attack.

(a)

(b)
Figure 4.9. The joint distribution of RSS and Δ𝑓 for (a) legitimate data and, (b) fake (shuffled)
data
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Table 4.2 compares the detection performance of different machine learning
methods including one- and two-hidden-layer neural networks, SVM, and logistic
regression. As it is shown, the logistic regression has the poorest performance which was
expected with the legitimate and fake data distribution similarities. The SVM is able to
provide a probability detection of 97.6%, which is remarkably high. However, the
probability of false alarm of this algorithm is also high, 95.2%, which makes this method
less accurate and not a suitable candidate for message injection detection. It should be noted
that a high probability of false alarm causes a high number of legitimate aircraft to be
detected as fake. The neural networks with one and two hidden layers provide the best
performance among all. Therefore, in the following, the focus is on performance analysis
and comparison of neural networks in detecting ADS-B message injection attacks.
Table 4.2. Comparison of different machine learning algorithm in detecting message injection
attacks
𝑷𝒅

𝑷𝒎

𝑷𝒇𝒂

Accuracy

Neural Network, 1 Hidden layer, 15
Neurons

98.5%

1.5%

0.4%

99%

Neural Network, 2 hidden layers,
{10, 10} Neurons

98.2%

1.8%

0.6%

98.8%

SVM (Quadratic Kernel)

97.6%

2.4%

95.2%

51.2%

Logistic Regression

45.5%

54.5%

53.1%

46.2%

Method/Metric
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Table 4.3 presents an ablation study performed to find out the impact of different
features on the detection of injected ADS-B messages. This analysis is done using a neural
network with one hidden layer and 10 hidden neurons. The activation function used is tanh.
There are a total of 127 combinations of features. However, only some important examples
are shown in this table. As can be seen, when only one feature is used, the accuracy of more
than 50% is not achievable which is reasonable for the dataset used for the training/testing.
For a number of features equal to two, the accuracy does not change, except in two cases
corresponding to (Δ𝑓 and Δ𝑣) and (𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑇 and RSS). Therefore, it is apparent that the three
features of Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣, and RSS can improve the accuracy of the classifier. This hypothesis is
confirmed by observing the accuracy of 85.2% obtained using these three features in the
table. Considering four features, it can be seen that by adding transmitter latitude 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 to
the mentioned three features, the highest accuracy of 90.9% has been achieved. Adding
transmitter longitude, 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑇 to this combination slightly improves the accuracy by 1% as
shown in the table. Increasing the number of features to six does not lead to any significant
improvement in the accuracy. However, the highest accuracy of 92% is achieved when all
seven features are used.
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Table 4.3. Ablation study to determine the impacts of features on detection accuracy of injection
attack
Number of Features
Used

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Feature
𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅
Δ𝑣
Δ𝑓
RSS
RSS, Δ𝑣
RSS, Δ𝑓
Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , RSS
𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , RSS
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , RSS
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , Δ𝑓
𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , Δ𝑓
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , Δ𝑣
RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , Δ𝑓
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , RSS
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , Δ𝑓
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , RSS, Δ𝑓
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , RSS, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑣
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑅 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑅 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑇 , 𝐿𝑜𝑛 𝑇 , RSS, Δ𝑓, Δ𝑣
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Accuracy
(%)
49.3
49.5
50.0
50.0
49.3
49.0
50.0
53.0
50.2
83.7
69.7
75.1
49.6
50.0
53.4
54.5
49.8
49.9
85.2
70.5
84.3
82.3
79.6
54.9
49.3
49.5
49.5
49.5
79.6
79.8
89.2
50.3
52.7
82.1
87.1
90.9
85.3
85.5
91.8
85.8
91.7
91.9
91.7
87.2
89.4
78.7
78.0
92.0

Table 4.4 represents the accuracy of the one-hidden-layer neural network with 10
hidden neurons in detecting ADS-B message injection attacks when different activation
functions and optimization solvers are used. Solvers are used to find the optimal weights
for the neural network. These algorithms try to minimize the cost function. The Limitedmemory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno Box-constraint (L-BFGS-B) algorithm uses
an estimate of the inverse Hessian to steer the cost function to a minimum value. The
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) looks for the minimum using classical Newton-Raphson
iterative solving but only operates on a subset of samples. The adaptive moment (Adam)
estimation uses a dynamic per-parameter learning rate to find the minimum of the cost
function. The first and second moments are used in the estimation of the best learning rate.
The highest accuracy is obtained by the L-BFGS-B solver algorithm with tanh activation
function.
Table 4.4. Accuracy of the neural network with 10 neurons in one layer
Activation/Solver

L-BFGS-B

SGD

Adam

Identity

46.7%

50.2%

48.0%

Logistic

97.9%

48.5%

56.2%

Tanh

98.2%

73.0%

92.3%

ReLu

97.1%

75.2%

87.8%
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Figure 4.10 shows a performance comparison of the neural network with one
hidden layer and different number of neurons in that layer. As it can be seen, employing 5
or less hidden neurons leads to poor performance as the neural network is not able to follow
the complexity embedded in the distribution of the data. As the number of neurons
increases to 15, the detection performance of the neural network significantly improves.
However, increasing the number of neurons from 15 to 25 in the hidden layer does not
improve the results significantly as the neural network finds no more complexity in the
data to capture and therefore, it gets saturated.

Figure 4.10. Accuracy, probabilities of detection, miss detection, and false alarm as a function of
the number of neurons in a one-hidden-layer neural network
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Figure 4.11 illustrates the graph of 𝑃𝑑 as a function of 𝑃𝑓𝑎 for a different number of
neurons. In this graph, the curve closest to the upper left corner is an indicator of the method
that provides the best performance because it provides the highest probability of detection
at the lowest probability of false alarm. A closer look at this graph reveals that the neural
network with 15 neurons in the hidden layer gives the best detection performance.

Figure 4.11. Probability of detection as a function of the probability of false alarm for different
number of neurons in a one-hidden-layer neural network

Table 4.5 provides the performance results of the neural networks with 2 hidden
layers and different number of neurons per layer. In this table, a pair of {a, b} neurons
indicates that the first and the second hidden layers have ‘a’ and ‘b’ neurons, respectively.
As it can be seen, increasing the number of hidden layers does not necessarily improve the
detection performance of the neural network in such a way that the network with 2 hidden
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layers, each with 5 neurons, provides a lower performance than that of the network with 1
hidden layer and 10 neurons in it, as shown in Figure 4.10. Using a two-hidden-layer neural
network with 10 neurons per hidden layer provides the highest 𝑃𝑑 and accuracy and lowest
𝑃𝑚 and 𝑃𝑓𝑎 among other two-hidden-layer models. However, it still does not outperform
the one-hidden-layer neural network with 15 neurons in it.
Table 4.5. Comparison of the detection performance of a two-hidden-layer neural network with
different number of hidden neurons
Method/Metric

𝑷𝒅

𝑷𝒎

𝑷𝒇𝒂

Accuracy

{5, 5} Neurons

89.3%

10.7%

5.2%

92.1%

{5, 10} Neurons

89.7%

10.3%

2.7%

93.5%

{10, 10} Neurons

98.2%

1.8%

0.6%

98.8%

{10, 15} Neurons

97.6%

2.4%

0.9%

98.4%

{15, 15} Neurons

97.6%

97.6%

0.6%

98.5%

Figure 4.12 shows the graph of 𝑃𝑑 as a function of 𝑃𝑓𝑎 for different numbers of
neurons in hidden layers. According to this figure, the neural network with 5 neurons in
each of the hidden layers provides the lowest probability of the detection for a given
probability of false alarm whereas the best performance is achieved by the network which
has 10 neurons per hidden layer.
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Figure 4.12. Probability of detection as a function of the probability of false alarm for different
number of neurons in a two-hidden-layer neural network

Table 4.6 reports and compares the detection performance of different machine
learning-based methods. In [67], the authors claim a maximum detection of 100% if the
attacker uses software-defined radio (SDR) units to launch the attacks. However, if the
attacker employs commercial ADS-B transponder to implement the attacks, the probability
of detection drops to a maximum of 70.9%. The authors of [94] obtained a probability of
detection of 99.6% and a probability of false alarm of 0.1% using the autocorrelation
coefficient considering a simple ground-based stationary attacker with constant sensing
power (attacker type 1). The authors of [95] achieved a maximum probability of detection
of 99%. However, their method suffers from a high probability of false alarm. It is notable
that all the values reported in Table 4.6 are highly dependent on the dataset used for training
and testing.
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Table 4.6. Comparison of the existing machine learning-based methods in detecting ADS-B
message injection attack
𝑷𝒅

𝑷𝒇𝒂

Aircraft-Transponder

[10.6%, 64.4%]

3.6%

No Aircraft-Transponder

[63.8%, 70.9%]

3.6%

Aircraft/No Aircraft-SDR

[12.6%, 100%]

3.6%

Pearson Correlation Coefficient

99.8% (Attacker type 1)

18.6%

Autocorrelation Coefficient

99.6% (Attacker type 1)

0.1%

Detection of Multiple Antennas

92.6% (Attacker type 1)

3.9%

99%

5%

61%

5%

99%

5%

90%

3%

98.5%

0.4%

Method

Leonardi et al
[67]

Strohmeier et al
[94]

Habler et al
[95]

LSTM (Anomalies introduced:
Random noise)
LSTM (Anomalies introduced:
Altitude change)
LSTM (Anomalies introduced: Route
change)
LSTM (Anomalies introduced:
velocity change)

Proposed method in this dissertation

Table 4.7 compares the proposed method with other existing methods to fight
against message injection attacks in terms of provided security level and implementation
considerations. It is notable that the Kalman filtering method is one of the methods that can
compete with the proposed method in this dissertation in terms of security and
implementation costs. However, as mentioned previously, Kalman filtering-based methods
are not suitable for nonlinear systems and take a great deal of time as they are dependent
on additional third-party sensor measurements which make them not appropriate for timecritical ADS-B message injection detection.
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Table 4.7. Comparison of the proposed method with non-machine learning based techniques for

Multilateration
[96]

N/A

N/A

Low

Medium

Distance
bounding
[97]

99%

0%

High

Medium

89.12%
(bias = 100m)
[98]

0.0001%

Low

Low

98.5%

0.4%

Low

Low

Kalman filtering
[98], [99]
Our method
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Compatibility

Cost

implementation

Difficulty

False alarm
rate

Detection rate

Type

ADS-B message injection detection

Utilizes a
separate
hardware
system.
Challengeresponse
protocol is
needed.
Additional
software is
required.
Additional
software is
required.

4.3 GPS Spoofing Attack Detection Analysis
In this section, examples of results of detecting GPS spoofing attacks using the
neural network algorithm are provided. Table 4.8 illustrates the simulation parameters used
in this work.
Table 4.8. Simulation parameters used in detecting GPS spoofing attacks
Parameter

Value/Range

Transmission frequency

1575.42 MHz

Type of code

C/A

Total number of training examples, 𝑁

2000

Ratio of legitimate to fake samples

50:50

Number of hidden layers

1, 2

Number of neurons in each hidden layer

[1, 25]

Activation function

tanh

Number of folds, K

10

Number of iterations

200

Figure 4.13 demonstrates the impact of database size on the detection accuracy of
a neural network with 20 hidden neurons when different solver algorithms and activation
functions are used. As it can be seen, after a database size of 2000 samples, the detection
accuracy provided by all the methods does not fluctuate significantly and demonstrates a
constant behavior. The highest and lowest accuracy, regardless of the database size, are
obtained by Adam-ReLu and SGD-Sigmoid, respectively.
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Figure 4.13. Accuracy as a function of database size

Table 4.9 represents the algorithm performance based on the distributions of
legitimate (0) and fake (1) samples in the training set of size 2000. A neural network with
20 hidden neurons and an SGD-Sigmoid solver-activation pair are used for this purpose to
be able to see the changes that different distribution can have on the performance. As it can
be seen, if the numbers of either legitimate samples or fake samples are more than 80% of
the whole database size, the detection performance is not good. This poor performance is
apparent by the probability of detection of 0% or the probability of false alarm of 100%.
The objective is to maximize the probability of detection while minimizing the
probabilities of false alarm and missed detection. Having said that, it can be observed that
this objective can be fulfilled with two distribution of 60%-40% and 50%-50%.
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Table 4.9. Algorithm performance based on different distributions of legitimate and fake samples
in the training set
Distribution of training
set

Accuracy

𝑷𝒅

𝑷𝒇𝒂

𝑷𝒎

10%

90%

0%

0%

100%

80%

20%

80%

0%

0%

100%

70%

30%

75.8%

31.8%

0.1%

68.2%

60%

40%

79.5%

68.9%

13.5%

31.1%

50%

50%

86.8%

87.7%

14.2%

12.3%

40%

60%

89.6%

99.8%

26.1%

0.2%

30%

70%

73.5%

100%

88.6%

0%

20%

80%

80%

100%

100%

0%

10%

90%

90%

100%

100%

0%

0

1

90%

To identify how different features affect the performance of the algorithm, a onehidden-layer neural network with 10 hidden neurons is fed with different combinations of
features from 1 to 5. A dataset of 2000 samples is used. The results of this analysis are
shown in Table 4.10. As it can be seen, there are a total of 31 combinations of features.
The lowest accuracy of 61.9% and the highest accuracy of 73.2% are achieved when the
carrier phase and pseudo range are used as the only features for detection, respectively. If
two features are used, a significant increase in the detection performance can be observed
such that the best performance with an accuracy of 92.6%, a probability of detection of
85.2%, and a probability of false alarm of 0% is obtained when pseudo range along with
Doppler shift are used for classification. By increasing the number of features to 3, an
overall improvement in detection performance can be seen. If SNR is used with PR and
DO, the highest accuracy of 98.2% with the detection and false alarm probabilities of
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99.4% and 3.1%, respectively, is observable. Moving to 4 and 5 numbers of features and
taking the above discussions into account, it can be seen that whenever the three features
of PR, DO, and SNR are combined with other features, an accuracy of at least 98% is
obtained.
Table 4.10. Impact of different features on detection performance
No. of
Features
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5

Accuracy
(%)
67.1
73.2
61.9
62.1
71.8
87.3
80.6
74.1
77.0
88.8
92.6
90.8
69.9
89.7
88.7
88.4
94.1
94.8
93.1
90.5
91.6
92.9
94.6
98.2
93.7
95.3
95.1
96.6
98.2
97.9
98.3

Features
SVN
PR
CP
DO
SNR
SVN, PR
SVN, CP
SVN, DO
SVN, SNR
PR, CP
PR, DO
PR, SNR
CP, DO
CP, SNR
DO, SNR
SVN, PR, CP
SVN, PR, DO
SVN, PR, SNR
SVN, CP, DO
SVN, CP, SNR
SVN, DO, SNR
PR, CP, DO
PR, CP, SNR
PR, DO, SNR
CP, DO, SNR
SVN, PR, CP, DO
SVN, PR, CP, SNR
SVN, CP, DO, SNR
SVN, PR, DO, SNR
PR, CP, DO, SNR
SVN, PR, CP, DO, SNR
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𝑃𝑑 (%)

𝑃𝑓𝑎 (%)

𝑃𝑚 (%)

54.4
50.0
54.2
58.1
66.2
78.7
73.7
73.0
83.1
83.1
85.2
90.9
66.1
91.4
91.7
85.0
89.0
94.8
92.1
94.1
97.4
87.1
97.4
99.4
92.4
92.4
98.5
98.1
99.0
98.8
99.2

20.1
3.6
30.4
33.9
22.6
4.2
12.4
24.8
29.1
5.5
0.0
9.2
26.3
12.0
14.2
8.1
0.8
5.3
5.8
13.1
14.2
1.2
8.3
3.1
5.0
1.9
8.3
4.9
2.6
3.0
2.6

45.6
50.0
45.8
41.9
33.8
21.3
26.3
27.0
16.9
16.9
14.8
9.1
33.9
8.6
8.3
15.0
11.0
5.2
7.9
5.9
2.6
12.9
2.6
0.6
7.6
7.6
1.5
1.9
1.0
1.2
0.8

Figure 4.14 illustrates the performance of a one-hidden-layer neural network as a
function of the number of hidden neurons in terms of accuracy, probability of detection,
and probability of false alarm. As it can be seen, if the number of hidden neurons increases,
the detection performance improves. For instance, increasing the number of hidden neurons
from 2 to 10 improves the accuracy by 9.2%. However, after about 14 hidden neurons, the
accuracy does not change significantly because the neural network is saturated and no more
relationship of features can be extracted by the algorithm. The same trend can be observed
for the probability of detection and probability of false alarm. It must be noted that
increasing the number of hidden neurons also increases the complexity of the algorithm.

Figure 4.14. Accuracy and probabilities of detection and false alarm as functions of number of
neurons in a one-hidden-layer NN
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To understand if adding a hidden layer to the NN improves the detection
performance, the hidden neurons are equally split between two layers for a two-hiddenlayer NN. Figure 4.15 shows the performance of this network as a function of the number
of neurons in the hidden layers in terms of accuracy, probability of detection, and
probability of false alarm. A pair of (a, b) indicates the number of hidden neurons in the
first layer, a, and in the second layer, b. As it can be seen, in this case, breaking one hidden
layer into two hidden layers improves the performance. For instance, considering the
accuracy, the one-hidden-layer network needs 10 neurons for an accuracy of about 98%
whereas the two-hidden-layer NN achieves the same accuracy with 6 neurons (3 neurons
in each hidden layer). This improved performance comes at a cost of increased complexity
which is a result of deploying two hidden layers. A comparison of these two neural
networks for the number of neurons up to 10 is also shown in Figure 4.16.

Figure 4.15. Accuracy and probabilities of detection and false alarm as functions of number of
neurons in a two-hidden-layer NN
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Figure 4.16. Comparison of the detection performance of one- and two-hidden-layer neural
networks

Table 4.11 shows the accuracy of the decision tree algorithm as a function of tree
depth. The depth of a tree is the maximum number of paths it takes to get from a leaf to a
root. One can observe that as the depth of the tree increases the detection accuracy
improves. A maximum accuracy of about 97% is achieved for tree depths equal or greater
than 4. Thus, increasing the tree depth further does not improve the accuracy as no more
hidden information can be extracted from the data.
Table 4.11. Detection accuracy of the decision tree in terms of tree depth
Tree depth

1

2

3

4

5

Accuracy

72.1%

85.6%

90.3%

96.8%

96.9%
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Table 4.12 represents the GPS spoofing attack detection accuracy using the random
forest algorithm in terms of the number of trees as well as the depth of each individual tree.
In this table, the number of trees varies from 1 to 5 whereas the depth of each tree ranges
from 1 to 4. As it can be seen, increasing both the number of trees and the number of tree
depth improve the accuracy. Using larger numbers of trees and depth, the data can be
broken down further and more information can be captured from it. An accuracy of about
98% can be obtained with a minimum of 3 trees and a depth equal to 4.
Table 4.12. Detection accuracy of the random forest as a function of the number of trees and tree
depth
# of trees

1

2

3

4

5

1

72.2%

78.6%

83.0%

83.4%

80.5%

2

85.6%

89.2%

89.8%

92.8%

91.6%

3

90.0%

92.8%

95.6%

96.0%

96.2%

4

96.4%

97.2%

97.9%

98.2%

98.1%

Depth

Figure 4.17 illustrates the accuracy of detecting GPS spoofing attacks using
different machine learning algorithms. As it can be seen, the poorest accuracy is provided
by the logistic regression algorithm whereas the highest accuracy of more than 99% is
achieved by the two-hidden-layer neural network with 4 hidden neurons in each layer. The
other three algorithms, decision tree, random forest, and one-hidden-layer neural network,
provide approximately similar detection accuracy. Having said that, due to the fact that the
decision tree algorithm is the least complex among all, this algorithm can be a good
candidate for detecting GPS spoofing/meaconing.
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br
Figure 4.17. Accuracy of different machine learning algorithm in detecting GPS spoofing attacks
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4.4 Jamming Attack Detection Analysis
In this section, examples of results of detecting jamming attacks using different
machine learning algorithms are provided. The methodology is designed to move from a
broad perspective to a focused optimization and selection of the best overall solution to
avoid underfitting and overfitting problems. After the optimizations for each algorithm are
performed, the best of each algorithm is compared. Table 4.13 illustrates the simulation
parameters used in this work.
Table 4.13. Simulation parameters used for jamming attack detection
Parameter

Value/Range

Transmission power, 𝑃𝑇

70 W

𝐸𝑏 /𝑁0

[-20, 20] dB

Transmission frequency, 𝑓𝑐

1090 MHz

Number of legitimate aircraft examples, 𝐾

3000

Number of fake aircraft examples, 𝑀

3000

Number of Eigenvalues, L

5

Number of iterations

300

To determine how the selection of features impacts the accuracy, different
combinations of features from 1 to 5, as shown in Table 4.14, are used in the random forest
algorithm. As it can be seen, there are a total of 31 combinations of features. The least
accuracy of 4.9% is obtained when Eb/N0 is used as the only feature for classification. As
two features are used for classification, depending on the features used, the accuracy
increases, such that the highest accuracy of about 85% is achieved when Eb/N0 is used with
energy statistic or with mean Eigenvalue. In the same category of two features, it is obvious
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that the combinations of features that do not include Eb/N0 do not improve the accuracy.
Moving to the number of features equal to three, it can be seen that the highest accuracy of
about 97% is obtained when BER is added to the Eb/N0 and energy. Also, an accuracy of
96.9% is achieved when BER is added to the Eb/N0 and mean Eigenvalue features.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the impacts of energy statistic and mean Eigenvalue on
the classification accuracy are almost identical. Although adding BPR to the same two
features of energy statistic and mean Eigenvalue can lead to a high accuracy, its accuracy
enhancement is not as much as when BER is added to them. In the case of employing four
features, if Eb/N0 is excluded, only an accuracy of 53.7% is provided. However, the use of
Eb/N0, BER, and energy statistic (or mean Eigenvalue) can guarantee an accuracy of more
than 97%. According to Table 4.14, the highest accuracy among all, 97.9%, is obtained
when all five features are used. However, if a 1% inaccuracy is tolerable, the complexity
involved in classification can be reduced by using only 3 features (Eb/N0, BER, and energy
statistic or Eb/N0, BER, and mean Eigenvalue).
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Table 4.14. Impact of different features on accuracy of random forest
Number of Features
Used

Feature

Accuracy

1
1
1
1
1

Eb/N0
BER
BPR
Energy
Mean Eigenvalue

4.90%
52.5%
53.0%
54.1%
52.5%

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Eb/N0, Mean Eigenvalue
Eb/N0, Energy
Eb/N0, BER
Eb/N0, BPR
BER, Energy
BER, Mean Eigenvalue
BER, BPR
BPR, Energy
BPR, Mean Eigenvalue
Energy, Mean Eigenvalue

85.0%
85.7%
70.2%
54.4%
53.3%
53.2%
52.4%
53.1%
54.4%
53.4%

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Eb/N0, BER, BPR
Eb/N0, BER, Energy
Eb/N0, BER, Mean Eigenvalue
Eb/N0, BPR, Energy
Eb/N0, BPR, Eigenvalue
Eb/N0, Energy, Mean Eigenvalue
BER, BPR, Energy
BER, BPR, Mean Eigenvalue
BER, Energy, Mean Eigenvalue
BPR, Energy, Mean Eigenvalue

72.7%
97.0%
96.9%
94.4%
95.2%
86.2%
54.7%
53.8%
54.9%
52.6%

4
4
4
4
4

BER, BPR, Energy, Mean Eigenvalue
Eb/N0, BER, Energy, Mean Eigenvalue
Eb/N0, BPR, Energy, Mean Eigenvalue
Eb/N0, BER, BPR, Energy
Eb/N0, BER, BPR, Mean Eigenvalue

53.7%
97.6%
95.9%
97.6%
97.8%

5

Eb/N0, BER, BPR, Mean Eigenvalue, Energy

97.9%

Table 4.15 represents a performance comparison of five types of SVM algorithms.
An SVM uses a kernel equation to calculate the similarity between the data being classified.
The linear, quadratic, cubic, RBF, and sigmoid kernels calculate the similarity function
using first order, second order, third order, Gaussian, and logarithmic equations,
respectively. The goal is to maximize accuracy and probability of detection while
minimizing the probability of false alarm. RBF clearly stands out as having the best
103

accuracy and lowest probability of false alarm. RBF has a median value for the probability
of detection. Overall, RBF SVM has the best performances out of the five types of SVM
algorithms. Yet, its performance is not acceptable for the problem of ADS-B jamming
detection.
Table 4.15. SVM with different kernels
Accuracy

𝑷𝒅

𝑷𝒇

Linear

63.1%

92.4%

66.1%

Quadratic

48.6%

85.7%

88.5%

Cubic

50.1%

96.2%

96.1%

RBF

68.4%

85.8%

49.1%

Sigmoid

51.1%

69.1%

66.9%

Kernel

Figure 4.18 illustrates the accuracy of the kNN algorithm as a function of the
number of neighbors it uses for different distance metrics. Distance is calculated using four
methods: Euclidean, Manhattan, Chebyshev, and Mahalanobis. The range of neighbors
analyzed is 1 to 50. As it can be seen, after a certain number of neighbors, the accuracy
does not alter significantly as more neighbors are used. Manhattan distance metric provides
a good accuracy and degrades the least overall as more neighbors are used to calculate
distances. However, the Euclidean distance algorithm using one nearest neighbor yields
the best accuracy.
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Figure 4.18. Accuracy of the kNN algorithm as a function of the number of neighbors for
different distance metrics

Figure 4.19 shows the accuracy, probability of detection, and probability of false
alarm as functions of the number of decision trees in the random forest algorithm. The
general trend is that, as more decision trees are used, the accuracy and probability of
detection increase and the probability of false alarm decreases. The goal is to maximize the
accuracy and probability of detection while minimizing the probability of false alarm.
When a few trees are used, the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm
are not monotonically improving. However, the accuracy, probability of detection, and
probability of false alarm reach steady-state values of about 98%, 97% and 1.5% after 15
trees, respectively.
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Figure 4.19. Performance of random forest algorithm as a function of the number of decision
trees

Table 4.16 represents the accuracy of the one-hidden-layer neural network in
detecting jamming attacks when different activation functions and optimization solvers are
used. The highest accuracy is by far obtained by the L-BFGS-B solver algorithm with either
tanh or ReLu activation function.
Table 4.16. Accuracy of the neural network with 10 neurons in one layer
Activation/Solver

L-BFGS-B

SGD

Adam

Identity

92.3%

75.1%

75.4%

Logistic

95.5%

50.4%

77.6%

Tanh

95.9%

76.8%

87.0%

ReLu

95.9%

77.1%

86.9%
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Figure 4.20 shows the accuracy, probability of detection, and probability of false
alarm of a neural network with one hidden layer as a function of the number of neurons
when the tanh activation function and L-BFGS-B solver are used. As it is known, neural
networks have an input layer, output layer, and some number of internal layers called
hidden layers. Increasing the number of neurons and layers adds complexity to the
calculation. There is a noticeable improvement when 3 and more neurons are used. The
best accuracy is obtained with 10 neurons. The best probability of detection corresponds
to 15 neurons whereas the probability of false alarm is the lowest for 5 neurons. To find
the best performance, the accuracy and probability of detection are maximized while the
probability of false alarm is minimized. Overall, the best performance is achieved with 10
neurons in the hidden layer.

Figure 4.20. Performance of the neural network with one hidden layer using tanh activation
function and L-BFGS-B solver
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Table 4.17 provides the accuracy, probability of detection, and probability of false
alarm of a two-hidden-layer neural network for different numbers of neurons in each of the
hidden layers. In this table, a pair of {a, b} neurons indicates that the first and the second
hidden layers have ‘a’ and ‘b’ neurons, respectively. The design with 5 neurons in the first
hidden layer and 2 neurons in the second hidden layer gives the best accuracy. The design
with 5 neurons in the first hidden layer and 5 neurons in the second hidden layer has the
best probability of detection. The design with 4 neurons in the first hidden layer and 5
neurons in the second hidden layer gives the lowest probability of false alarm. Overall, the
design that has the best performance in all three categories is the one with 5 neurons in the
first hidden layer and 2 neurons in the second hidden layer.
Table 4.17. Performance of neural network with two hidden layers using tanh activation function
and L-BFGS-B solver
# of
Neurons

{2,1}

{3,3}

{3,4}

Accuracy 93.2%

94%

93.9% 93.8% 95.1% 95.4% 95.3% 95.9% 95.7% 94.8%

𝑃𝑑
𝑃𝑓

{3,5}

{4,2}

{4,3}

{4,5}

{5,2}

{5,3}

{5,5}

94.4% 94.5% 94.3% 93.5% 95.7% 95.6% 94.2% 95.5% 95.5% 95.9%
8%

6.4%

6.4%

5.9%

5.5%

4.8%

3.6%

3.7%

4.1%

6.3%

Figure 4.21 illustrates the best performance of all the algorithms in terms of the
accuracy, probability of detection, and probability of false alarm. The best performances
with respect to each method is achieved by the SVM with RBF kernel, the k-NN with
Euclidean distance and 1 neighbor, the random forest with 15 trees, the neural network
with one hidden layer (10 neurons), and the neural network with two hidden layers (5 and
2 neurons on the hidden layers). In terms of accuracy, the best performance is achieved by
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random forest. The highest accuracy obtained by SVM is 68.4%, which is the worst among
all other machine learning methods compared for detecting jamming attacks. The highest
probability of detection and false alarm are also obtained by the random forest algorithm.
The performance of neural networks with one and two hidden layers are approximately
similar. Having said that, a one hidden layer neural network can be a better choice as it
requires a lesser computational cost. Overall, as shown in Figure 4.21, the best and worst
performance is achieved by random forest and SVM, respectively.

Figure 4.21. Comparison of the best performance of all methods
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
According to a recent report by the FAA [100], it is foreseen that the number of
passengers boarding on the U.S commercial air carriers will increase to 1.052 billion in
2036 compared to 726 million in 2016. Such forecasts have motivated the aviation
industries to shift from legacy approaches to the next generation air traffic control methods.
Accordingly, to support air traffic control and increase its safety and capacity, the FAA
published a regulation in 2010 titled “Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADSB) Out equipment performance requirements” [1], which mandates aircraft in certain
classes of airspace, including A, B, and C within the national U.S. airspace system, to be
equipped with ADS-B avionics by January 2020. ADS-B technology employs global
navigation satellite systems for its operation to generate a clear picture of air traffic. It
continually broadcasts information of the aircraft carrying the ADS-B, including its
identity, position, and velocity to nearby aircraft and ground stations.
Due to operational requirements, the FAA necessitates that the ADS-B messages
are broadcasted as plaintexts over unencrypted wireless datalink to make them easily
accessible by every entity in the network. This ease of access to ADS-B data can potentially
incite malicious activities and terroristic threats. An attacker can capture and modify the
ADS-B messages, delete legitimate ones, inject misleading ones, or jam the whole system.
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Such malicious actions can have highly destructive impacts on the national airspace system
[101].
Several techniques have been suggested to detect ADS-B attacks [9], [102].
However, most of these methods are not efficient because they are costly, difficult to
implement, unreliable, non-real-time, and dependent on other surveillance systems. In
addition, extra hardware and protocol modifications are necessary for using these methods.
To address these problems, this dissertation aimed at developing attack detection
methods based on supervised machine learning algorithms [103-104]. These detection
methods are accurate, robust, and independent, and do not require any modifications to the
ADS-B protocol and infrastructure. The only requirement of these methods is that they
should be appropriately trained by training datasets before being able to detect attacks.
To develop and meet the objectives of this dissertation, in Chapter 2, ADS-B
systems and attacks targeting these systems were reviewed. In addition, state-of-the-art
security solutions were investigated and their pros and cons were examined. It was shown
that there are no single methods able to comprehensively secure the ADS-B. Any solution
is a partial answer to addressing threats of ADS-B attacks.
In Chapter 3, the methodologies of developing attack scenarios and training
datasets were explained. Many features that were used to create training datasets were
described and mathematical models of several machine learning algorithms were provided.
In Chapter 4, the proposed methods were extensively tested and the efficiencies of
different machine learning methods such as neural networks, support vector machine,
decision tree, and random forest were analyzed. To evaluate these efficiencies, four metrics
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were used, namely probability of detection, probability of miss-detection, probability of
false alarm, and accuracy. The parameters of each machine learning algorithm were
optimized to get the highest accuracy. The results show that message injection attacks can
efficiently be detected with a one-hidden-layer neural network with a probability of
detection and a probability of false alarm equal to 98.5% and 0.4%, respectively. The
results also show that neural networks with one or two hidden layers can detect GPS
spoofing attacks with an accuracy of more than 98%. In terms of jamming attacks, random
forest algorithm with 15 trees is able to provide the best detection performance with an
accuracy of about 98%.
In conclusion, the proposed machine learning-based attack detection methods were
shown to be suitable candidates for use in ADS-B systems and networks as they can
effectively detect the attacks in near real-time with minimal to no modifications to the
ADS-B devices. These methods can be used in ground stations as well as aircraft and can
provide a high probability of detection and a low probability of false alarm compared to
the existing methods. However, there are still several unsolved problems related to the
ADS-B security that must be filled with appropriate methods. In the following, some
potential future works are described.
A possible avenue of research is the use of unsupervised machine learning
algorithms, which are able to classify unlabeled data. Therefore, they can be suitable
candidates to cluster unknown received messages before any further processing. In
addition, the applications of online learning in machine learning algorithms can also be
investigated. Using online learning, these algorithms can be trained as new data is received.
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Another future research direction is to investigate and develop countermeasure
techniques after attacks are detected. In this regard, a potential research direction is to
investigate the symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods. Although the existing
ADS-B protocol requires unencrypted data to be broadcasted over a limited bandwidth, inband and out-of-band common control channels can be used to enable powerful
encryptions methods to provide authentication and integrity in the system. Moreover, these
approaches can solve the problem of sharing the spreading code in spread spectrum
schemes which are robust solutions to jamming attacks.
As discussed previously, although each solution provides some level of security,
there is still no single method to fully secure the ADS-B communications. Thus, another
potential future work is to develop multi-layer security frameworks composed of several
methods to detect and countermeasure attacks targeting the ADS-B systems. Statistical
approaches such as Bayesian models can be investigated in this regard to provide prediction
capabilities in these frameworks.
Another future research direction is developing methods to increase the limited
communication range of ADS-B on the 1090 MHz datalink. Viable solutions need to be
developed for aircraft operating in remote geographic areas. One possible approach is to
employ satellite-based ADS-B to overcome the problem of ADS-B coverage in farreaching areas. The use of suborbital stations such as stratospheric balloons can also be
investigated for this purpose.
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